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11.1  Introduction 
11.1.1  Overview 
Measures of tax burden are indicators of how well tax policy meets one of 
its primary goals, equitably raising the revenues needed to run government. 
Equity has two aspects. The first, vertical equity, concerns the way taxes are 
distributed among taxpayers with different abilities to pay.  The second, hori- 
zontal equity, concerns the way taxes are distributed among taxpayers with the 
same ability to pay.  Tax burden measures thus answer broad economic and 
social questions about the effect of  tax policy on the distribution of  income 
and wealth. 
The history of  these measures incorporates the histories of  economic and 
world affairs, major tax and economic policy legislation, intellectual and so- 
cial movements, and data and technological innovation in the fifty years since 
the first meeting of the Conference on Research in Income and Wealth. This 
paper reviews the effect of these measures on federal tax policy in a historical 
and statistical context. 
The variety of tax burden measures over this period reflect advances in eco- 
nomic and measurement theory, changing policy concerns, new data sources, 
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and external social and economic forces. Advances in the theory and measure- 
ment of  income, wealth, and taxes generated corresponding changes in  the 
analytical and  computational methodologies used  to  measure  tax  burden. 
Throughout the history of  empirical tax burden measurement in  the United 
States, changing policy concerns focused attention on different distributional 
questions. The changing focuses provided  the impetus for new  analytical 
techniques. New data sources, together with these techniques, in their turn 
suggested new views of  tax burden and new directions for tax reforms. The 
major social and economic forces of the last fifty years as well as advances in 
economic theory and data development influenced evaluations of  tax burden 
measures. The timeline in table 1  1.1 indicates overlaps among these develop- 
ments. 
The focus throughout this paper is the interrelation among tax burden mea- 
sures, the development of  tax policy, and the policy implications and uses of 
advances in data, economic theory, and measurement. Each of these topics is 
treated fully elsewhere. The structure of the U.S. tax system and of the gen- 
eral process of  tax policy formulation are discussed in Blough (1952) and 
Pechman (1987). Summaries and syntheses of tax incidence theory are given 
in Mieszkowski (1969), Whalley (1984), Musgrave (1985), and Kotlikoff and 
Summers (1987). Shoup (1972) assesses the state of quantitative work on tax 
incidence and tax burden in light of fifty years of effort by the National Bureau 
of  Economic Research to improve quantitative research in economics. Re- 
views and assessments of  some tax burden measures are given in Musgrave 
and  Thin  (1948),  Atkinson  (1980),  Devarajan,  Fullerton,  and  Musgrave 
(1980), Auerbach and Rosen (1980), and Kiefer (1984). 
11.1.2  Tax Burden Defined 
Definitions of a tax, of ability to pay, and of the burden of taxes are neces- 
sary prerequisites to measuring tax burden. A tax is a compulsory payment to 
the government from which the taxpayer receives no direct benefit. This defi- 
nition distinguishes user charges and commercial receipts from government 
enterprises (e.g., state-owned liquor stores) from taxes. All three are govern- 
ment receipts, but only the tax component is included in tax burden studies. 
The inclusion of income, sales, and excise taxes generates little controversy. 
The appropriate treatment of  property taxes and other taxes that are tied to 
benefits, such as the payroll taxes for Social Security and unemployment in- 
surance, are less clear-cut. In the case of  payroll taxes, individuals receive 
direct benefits when they qualify for the insurance payments but receive these 
payments at a time removed from the time the taxes were paid. Most tax bur- 
den studies include property and benefit taxes in their measures of total taxes 
paid. 
Ability to pay is generally measured by income. The Haig-Simons income 
definition, a broad-based concept of  net  accretions to economic power (or 
consumption plus change in net worth), is the most common theoretical in- 
come concept (see Musgrave 1985). The actual income measures used in tax Table 11.1  Timeline of Major Events in the History of Tax Burden Measurement 
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burden studies usually differ from a complete Haig-Simons measure. Adjusted 
gross income (AGI) is widely used in tax burden studies in part because it is 
readily available in Statistics of Income publications. Defined by the relevant 
sections of  the Internal Revenue Code, AGI generally omits many compo- 
nents of income, such as transfer payments, and allows deductions that are 
not costs of  doing business. Other income measures used in recent tax burden 
studies, such as modified economic income and family economic income, ex- 
pand adjusted gross income to approximate more nearly Haig-Simons mea- 
sures that are independent of current tax laws. 
Definitions and measures of income and wealth are given in NBER (1937) 
and (1943), National Resources Committee (1938), Goldsmith et. al. (1954), 
and Smith ( 1975). 
Payment of  taxes, through lower factor incomes or higher product prices, 
reduces a taxpayer’s real income. Tax  burden measures attempt to quantify 
this decrease in utility and to evaluate the decrease against a measure of ability 
to  pay.  Taxes may  impose an  excess burden  on  the taxpayer  beyond the 
amount of tax payments if they also induce distortions in the economic system 
by altering relative prices. Taxation also imposes administrative and compli- 
ance costs.  With  the exception of  general equilibrium models, tax  burden 
studies use taxes paid as the tax measure and attempt neither to calculate the 
excess burden nor to count administrative and compliance costs, 
1  1.1.3 
Tax  burden  studies of  the  1930s are the earliest U.S.  studies to include 
measures of  taxes at all levels of government. These studies commonly pre- 
sent results in terms of the tax liability and income of representative taxpay- 
ers. A typical category of representative taxpayer would be married taxpayers 
with no dependents whose income is under $5,000 annually. This form of tax 
burden measure continues to be widely used in policy debates because it can 
be focused on particular aspects of a tax proposal and because it is most acces- 
sible to nonspecialists. 
Aggregate data studies calculate the proportion of  taxes paid by  each in- 
come class and also the proportion of taxes to income within each class. These 
measures, first calculated in the early 1940s, have largely been replaced. 
Current tax policy analysis relies on disaggregated general equilibrium and 
microdata measures, although representative taxpayer studies continue as a 
third strain. Both of the newer approaches make use of  advances in the fre- 
quency and availability of detailed economic data from the federal statistical 
system. 
Microdata models depend on the large amount of survey and administrative 
record information on individuals that became available starting in the late 
1950s and the 1960s together with computer capabilities for handling large 
and complex data files. Applied  general equilibrium models became more 
useful for policy analysis as computational algorithms became available that 
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permitted larger and more realistic models than the original analytical two-by- 
two models. 
As analytical capabilities have grown, so too have the demands of  policy- 
makers in the number, frequency, and detail of desired analyses of the distri- 
butional consequences of  specific tax proposals as well as for overviews of 
the entire tax structure. Microdata simulation models are the major tool that 
Congress and the Treasury use ih examining these detailed policy questions. 
Constraints on the ability of these models to answer policy questions, how- 
ever, continue. One constraint is the lack of sufficiently detailed data on taxes, 
income, wealth, and consumption for the analyses now required. In general, 
these data are not collected together in the same survey. Methodologies for 
statistical linkages between surveys continue to be topics of professional dis- 
agreement. The concerns Morgenstem (1963) raised about the false precision 
economists attribute to data derived from surveys and to estimates based on a 
series of data sources that are themselves estimates also apply to estimates of 
tax burden. Few statistics are presented with measures of overall reliability of 
the estimates. Another constraint is the practical capacities of available com- 
puter systems in providing multiple simulations, at the desired level of detail, 
on a daily basis during legislative consideration of tax measures. 
11.1.4  Organization of the Paper 
The second section of  this paper provides the historical, statistical, and 
theoretical background to the approaches that formed tax policy over the last 
half century. The four major approaches to measuring tax burden, representa- 
tive taxpayers, aggregate data, microdata, and  applied general equilibrium, 
are discussed in detail in sections 1 1.3-1 1.6. The microdata model currently 
used at the Department of  the Treasury in analyzing tax legislation is de- 
scribed in greater detail in section ll  .7 to highlight continuing policy needs 
for improved capabilities for measuring income and tax burden. 
11.2  Background 
11.2.1  Historical Background 
Assessments of the extent and distribution of tax burdens became important 
once income taxes became important sources of federal, state, and local reve- 
nues. Prior to the initiation of the modem federal income tax in  1913, most 
federal revenues came from customs duties and excise taxes. For many years 
after 1913, only a small number of relatively well-to-do individuals paid in- 
come tax, and subsequent legislation continued to exempt lower-income per- 
sons while raising a growing proportion of federal revenues. The four Reve- 
nue Acts of the  1920s (1921, 1924, 1926, and  1928), for example, raised 
personal exemptions. By the beginning of the Depression, federal personal 
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60% of federal revenues although relatively few persons were federal taxpay- 
ers. During the  1930s, both the sources of  government revenues and their 
shares of gross national product (GNP) changed. Income and sales taxes were 
broadly adopted by states. At the same time, the federal government increased 
its revenue demands to try to bring the budget into balance during the Depres- 
sion and to finance reform and relief programs. Federal excise taxes, under- 
stood at the time to be regressive, accounted for growing proportions of reve- 
nues. By 1934, just prior to the period covered by this paper, excise taxes had 
grown to 61% of federal revenues and had grown in absolute terms from $1.0 
billion in 1930 to $2.2 billion in  1934. The changing sources of  government 
revenues and the growing share of taxes relative to GNP since 1929 are given 
in table 11.2. 
The major external events of  the last fifty years that affected federal tax 
policy are well known. The timeline of table 1  1.1 above gives an overview of 
these events and of  the developments in  economic theory and measurement 
that gave rise to new measures of  tax burden. After the Depression of  the 
1930s came an upturn caused by a combination of the prewar military buildup 
and relief spending. World War  I1 was followed by a brief bout of high infla- 
tion and by small economic downturns. Another military buildup and inflation 
accompanied the Korean War,  followed by two downturns in the  1950s and 
another in  1960. The subsequent and lengthy economic expansion included 
the Vietnam War  buildup of  the late 1960s and its accompanying inflation. 
The 1970s brought two oil price shocks, two recessions, and continuing infla- 
tion.  The deepest of  the postwar  recessions in  1981-82  preceded  a long- 
awaited downturn in inflation and the current sustained expansion. 
Tax policy kept pace throughout this period with the changing role of gov- 
ernment in  the economy and with changing economic circumstances. The 
Revenue Acts of  the  Roosevelt administration reviewed and somewhat re- 
formed federal tax laws during the 1930s to accord more closely to principles 
of ability to pay, reduction of tax avoidance, closure of loopholes, and simpli- 
fication of  tax administration. The Social Security Act of  1935 established 
two new tax and benefit systems, Social Security and the federal-state unem- 
ployment compensation systems. Both systems were funded by payroll taxes. 
At the outset of the Second World War, the need to finance a rapid military 
buildup and restrain growing consumer demand required estimates of the tax 
burden  and  its distribution to influence policy direction. Income tax  rates 
could be increased selectively to staunch an increase in demand, if the income 
classes that consumed the items that would be in shortest supply could be 
identified. Selective increases in excise taxes could also slow demand. 
Testimony on the Revenue Revision of  1941  by the chief of staff of the Joint 
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation expressed concern about inflation 
arising from full employment. “The tax base should be broadened to curtail 
private consumption by either general or specific consumption taxes” (U.S. 
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hearings, the administrator of the Office of Price Administration and Civilian 
Supply argued for taxes that would imply “positive encouragement of defense 
production and the discouragement of  civilian consumptions of  those com- 
modities and services which compete with military demands” (642). Selective 
excise tax increases were endorsed along with an increase in individual in- 
come tax rates in the lower and middle income brackets (646). At the same 
time, policymakers were concerned that war financing not worsen inequities 
in the current distribution of tax burden or impose economic hardship on low- 
income taxpayers (e.g., Blum 1965, 318). Their concerns were reflected in 
the continuing series of Treasury tax burden studies (e.g., Shere 1934; U.S. 
Department of the Treasury 1937, 1940, 1947a, and  1947b) and in the con- 
tinuing discussion of  tax burden in decision making (e.g.,  U.S.  Congress, 
House Committee on Ways  and Means 1942; U.S. Congress, House  1942; 
U.S. Congress, Senate 1942; U.S. Department of the Treasury 1942). 
The Revenue Act of  1942 dramatically increased the proportion of the pop- 
ulation that would pay income tax by lowering exemptions. (The number of 
taxable individual income tax returns increased from 4 million in 1939 to 43 
million in 1945.) Collecting the income tax through the existing estimated tax 
payment system created difficulties for the new  taxpayers. The Current Tax 
Payment Act of  1943 initiated wage withholding at the source, beginning in 
1944, to ease collection and also to move income from the taxpayer to the 
government more quickly. 
The  massive  unemployment  of  the  Depression  raised  concerns  about 
whether the full employment during World War  I1 would be followed by re- 
peating either the Depression or the post-World War I inflation. One conse- 
quence of  those concerns, and a clear statement of  the policy influence of 
Keynesian principles, was the enactment of the Employment Act of  1946 in 
February 1946. The first of  a three-part declaration of  policy made it “the 
continuing policy  and  responsibility of  the Federal Government to use all 
practicable means . . .  to foster and promote useful employment opportunities 
. . . and promote full employment and production, and  increased real  in- 
come” (U.S. Congress, JEC 1981, 1). Another consequence of those concerns 
was  the delay in tax reductions for individuals. The Revenue Act of  1945, 
recognizing the length of  the adjustment to peacetime and the pent-up de- 
mand, kept the wartime  structure of  personal  income and excise taxes  in 
place. The Revenue Act of 1946 reduced income taxes somewhat by lowering 
tax rates and raising personal exemptions. 
By the 1950s, Korean War requirements for increased defense spending and 
curtailed consumption raised concerns about setting off  another streak of infla- 
tion in the process. As with World War  I1 financing, an increase in income 
taxes was recommended. Tax burden became an important policy considera- 
tion because existing statutory federal income tax rates were high, reflecting 
the tax structure of World War 11.  Surtax rates reached 50% at an income of 
$16,000  and  rose  to  a  maximum  of  91%  in  1950. The  administration’s Table 11.2  Federal, State, and Local Taxes Relative to GNP, 1929-88 
Taxes as a % of  GNP  Nominal Taxes ($ billions) 
Federal  Federal 
Indirect  State  Indirect  Total  State 
Calendar  Business  Social  and  GNP  Business  Social  Federal  and  Total 
Year  Personal  Corporate  Taxes  Insurance  Total  Local  Total  ($ billions)  Personal  Corporate  Taxes  Insurance  Taxes  Local  taxes 
1929  1.3 
1930  1.2 
1931  .8 
1932  .5 
1933  .9 
1934  .9 
1935  1.1 
1936  1.3 
1937  1.9 
1938  1.9 
1939  1.3 
1940  1.4 
1941  1.6 
1942  3.0 
1943  8.6 
1944  8.3 
1945  9.1 
1946  8.1 
1947  8.3 
1948  7.3 
1949  6.2 
1950  6.3 
1951  7.8 
1952  8.8 
1953  8.7 
1954  7.8 
1955  7.7 
1.2  1.2  .2 
.8  1.1  .2 
.5  1.2  .3 
.5  1.5  .3 
.9  2.9  .4 
.9  3.4  .3 
1.1  3.0  .3 
1.6  2.8  .5 
1.4  2.6  1.8 
1.1  2.6  2.1 
1.4  2.5  2.1 
2.6  2.6  2.1 
5.8  2.9  2.1 
7.0  2.5  2.0 
7.1  2.5  2.2 
5.9  2.9  2.3 
4.8  3.3  2.8 
4.0  3.7  3.3 
4.5  3.3  2.6 
4.5  3.1  2.0 
3.7  3.1  2.2 
6.0  3.1  2.2 
6.5  2.8  2.2 
5.3  2.9  2.2 
5.2  2.9  2.1 
4.5  2.6  2.3 
5.2  2.6  2.4 
3.8  7.3  11.1 
3.3  8.6  11.9 
2.7  10.1  12.8 
2.9  12.5  15.4 
5.0  12.9  17.9 
5.5  13.1  18.6 
5.5  12.5  18.0 
6.1  10.3  16.5 
7.7  10.0  17.6 
7.6  10.9  18.5 
7.3  10.5  17.9 
8.7  10.0  18.6 
12.4  8.3  20.6 
14.5  6.7  21.1 
20.3  5.7  26.0 
19.4  5.3  24.7 
20.0  5.4  25.4 
19.2  6.1  25.3 
18.8  6.5  25.3 
16.8  6.8  23.6 
15.1  7.5  22.6 
17.5  7.4  24.9 
19.4  7.0  26.4 
19.3  7.2  26.5 
18.9  7.4  26.3 
17.3  7.8  25.0 


















































































1.2  .2 
1  .o  .2 
.9  .2 
.9  .2 
1.6  .2 
2.2  .2 
2.2  .2 
2.3  .4 
2.4  1.6 
2.2  1.8 
2.3  1.9 
2.6  2.1 
3.6  2.6 
4.0  3.2 
4.9  4.2 
6.2  4.9 
7.1  5.9 
7.8  7.1 
7.8  6.1 
8.0  5.2 
8.0  5.6 
8.9  6.3 
9.4  7.5 
10.3  7.8 
10.9  7.8 
9.7  8.7 
10.6  9.9 
3.9  7.6 
3.0  7.8 
2.1  7.7 
1.7  7.3 
2.8  7.2 
3.6  8.6 
4.0  9.1 
5.1  8.6 
7.0  9.1 
6.5  9.3 
6.7  9.6 
8.7  10.0 
15.5  10.4 
23.0  10.6 
39.2  10.9 
41.1  11.1 
42.6  11.6 
40.7  13.0 
44.2  15.4 
44.0  17.7 
39.3  19.5 
50.5  21.3 
64.7  23.4 
67.7  25.4 
70.4  27.4 
64.3  29.0 
































































































































































































18.3  8.2  26.5 
18.3  8.5  26.8 
17.4  9.2  26.6 
18.3  9.4  27.7 
18.8  9.7  28.5 
18.5  10.1  28.7 
18.7  10.2  28.9 
19.0  10.4  29.5 
17.9  10.7  28.6 
17.8  10.7  28.5 
18.6  11.0  29.6 
18.7  11.5  30.2 
19.8  12.1  31.9 
20.7  12.5  33.3 
19.2  13.4  32.6 
18.4  13.9  32.3 
19.1  14.8  33.9 
19.4  14.4  33.8 
20.0  14.5  34.4 
18.4  15.0  33.4 
19.1  15.2  34.2 
19.3  15.1  34.4 
19.6  14.7  34.3 
20.1  14.2  34.3 
20.3  14.3  34.5 
21.0  13.9  34.9 
20.1  14.2  34.3 
19.4  14.3  33.7 
19.2  14.3  33.6 
19.7  14.5  34.1 
19.5  14.6  34.1 
20.4  14.6  35.0 






































































































































































78.5  35.0  113.5 
82.5  38.5  121.0 
79.4  42.0  121.4 
90.6  46.6  137.2 
96.9  50.0  146.9 
99.0  54.1  153.1 
107.2  58.6  165.8 
115.6  63.4  179.0 
116.2  69.8  186.0 
125.8  75.5  201.3 
143.5  85.2  228.7 
152.6  94.1  246.7 
176.9  107.9  284.8 
199.7  120.8  320.5 
195.3  135.8  331.1 
202.8  153.6  356.4 
232.2  179.3  411.5 
263.7  196.4  460.1 
293.9  213.1  507.0 
294.9  239.6  534.5 
340.2  270.1  610.3 
384.1  300.1  684.2 
441.3  330.3  771.6 
505.0  355.3  860.3 
553.8  390.0  943.8 
639.6  425.6  1,065.2 
635.3  449.4  1,084.7 
659.9  487.6  1,147.5 
725.9  540.4  1,266.3 
788.5  579.7  1,368.2 
827.4  618.8  1,446.2 
915.6  651.1  1,566.7 
975.6  700.3  1,676.0 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 1988. National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929-1982. Statistical Tables, 
1986; and Survey of Current Business (May). 
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proposal would have raised these rates to 54% and 95% respectively (U.S. 
Congress, Senate 195  1). The existing structure had provoked enough public 
displeasure over the preceding 15 years that at least 25 states adopted resolu- 
tions calling for a constitutional amendment to cap effective rates at 25% on 
income, estate, and gift taxes (U.S. Congress, JCER and Select Committee 
on Small Business 1952). A series of tax burden studies entered the debate on 
several Revenue Acts (Musgrave et al.  1951; Tucker 1951; U.S. Congress, 
JCER  1951; Colm and Wald  1952). The Revenue Act of  1951 nevertheless 
raised tax rates, but not to the full extent of the administration proposal. 
The tax burden studies of the early 1950s generated heated debate among 
economists. At the same time, objections to conflicting assumptions in statis- 
tical computations of the tax burden opened further avenues of debate (Prest 
1955). The return to a peacetime economy in the mid-l950s, together with 
two recessions in that decade, continued to place tax policy among the leading 
economic policy tools and tax burden, therefore, among the leading policy 
questions. A major review of federal income tax provisions was conducted in 
a series of congressional hearings in 1959. The published report of those hear- 
ings dedicated a quarter of  its 2,400 printed pages to the individual income 
tax and its distributive consequences (U.S. Congress, House Committee on 
Ways  and Means 1959). The postwar Internal Revenue Code, however, re- 
mained largely unaltered through a major recodification in 1954, apart from 
surtaxes imposed permanently during the Korean War. 
By  1963, the level and structure of  taxes were perceived to be sufficient 
impediments to full employment and economic growth that President Ken- 
nedy’s State of the Union Address deemed “a substantial reduction and revi- 
sion in  Federal income taxes” to be “the most urgent task confronting the 
Congress in 1963.” The Revenue Act of  1964 embodied some of the reforms 
in the President’s Tax Message of  1963 by lowering tax rates across the board 
and lowering overall tax liabilities. It also set the tax-free income level (by 
adjusting the personal exemption and the standard deduction) to correspond 
to the official poverty level so that the poor would be exempt from federal 
income tax. The Excise Tax  Reduction Act  of  1965 continued reforms by 
repealing many excise taxes and lowering excise tax  rates raised during the 
Korean War. A Vietnam War financing surtax applied from 1968 to 1970. 
Inflation adjustments were reflected in the changes of  the Revenue Act of 
1969, which instituted a schedule to raise personal exemptions and standard 
deductions over the following several years. The Tax  Reform Act of  1976 
raised deductions, increased the capital gains rate, increased the minimum tax 
rate,  and lowered the minimum tax exemption. Tax  acts of  the late  1970s 
adjusted  exemptions  and  widened  tax  brackets  in  response  to  inflation- 
induced bracket creep. The Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax, essentially an oil 
profits surtax, was enacted in 1980. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of  1981 
(ERTA) lowered  tax  rates,  introduced inflation indexing, and lowered the 
maximum rates on capital gains. Both the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibil- 
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responded to growing federal deficits by  raising additional revenues. Most 
recently, the Tax  Reform Act of 1986 broadened the tax base, lowered tax 
rates, and raised tax thresholds above the poverty level for most taxpayers 
while maintaining revenue neutrality. 
11.2.2  Statistical and Theoretical Background 
The heavy data demands of tax burden measures confronted the same scarc- 
ity of  data as did other policy needs in the 1930s. The integral link between 
measures of income and wealth and tax burden are clearly shown in the pro- 
ceedings of the first Conference on Research in National Income and Wealth 
(NBER 1937). The treatment of tax revenues in the measurement of income, 
tax incidence, and distinctions between taxable income and national income 
were discussed in papers and comments by Shoup, Blough, Colm, and New- 
comer. One major data gap, for tax burden measurement as well as for other 
social and economic policy development, was an estimate of the distribution 
of  income. A review of  data sources for constructing a size distribution of 
income noted serious gaps, including “No continuous source yields a distri- 
bution by size of either family or individual income for the United States. . . . 
In the absence of complete coverage, a good sample would meet the chief 
needs. That we  are far from such a goal is obvious” (NBER 1943, p. 84). 
Income tax-return  data themselves were a crucial component of estimates of 
the upper tail of that distribution whose other major component was a 1935- 
36 survey of consumer purchases (see Baird and Fine 1939). 
In response to the absence of vital data, among other reasons, the Office of 
Statistical Standards was established in  the Bureau of  the Budget in  1939. 
Congressional concern over data needed for policy analysis was reflected in 
debate preceding the Employment Act of  1946 and in its provisions. To  help 
effect its goals, the act required the president to submit a semiannual eco- 
nomic report to Congress. The act also established the Council of  Economic 
Advisers to the President, whose responsibilities included assisting in  the 
preparation of  the President’s Economic Report, and the Joint Committee on 
the Economic Report (now the Joint Economic Committee) whose responsi- 
bilities included advising Congress with respect to the President’s Economic 
Report, in part by submitting its own reviews of the report. One thread of the 
debate on the passage of this act was the lack of timely and detailed data on 
employment, expenditures, and prices. The Joint Committee on the Economic 
Report (JCER) quickly set up the Subcommittee on Economic Statistics in 
1947 to review the existence and timeliness of  economic data necessary to 
make and evaluate federal economic policy.  One of the subcommittee’s first 
acts was to issue a brief report on statistical gaps in  1948 (U.S. Congress 
JCER  1948). Efforts at filling the gaps noted in the subcommittee report on 
statistical gaps were detailed in subsequent Economic Reports of  the Presi- 
dent. The Subcommittee  on Economic Statistics itself continued to hold hear- 
ings and publish detailed reports (see, e.g., U.S. Congress, JCER 1954). 
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on growing data availability), new consumer budget and finances studies, the 
addition of  income data to the 1940 decennial census, and the Statistics of 
Income program contributed some of the basic data necessary for calculating 
measures of tax burden. By the 1950s, exclusions from taxable income such 
as fringe benefits had grown in importance. Data on income, consumption, 
and taxes of individuals, rather than aggregates by  income class, were re- 
quired to examine concerns that these exclusions were distributed unevenly 
among taxpayers with similar incomes. 
Filling the data gaps was a slow process, however, and the lack of  data 
became a recurring theme of both researchers attempting to measure tax bur- 
den and policy users of  those measures. Neither the data themselves nor the 
technology to access and link large samples of individual records were avail- 
able until the mid-1960s. The first item listed in the Subcommittee on Eco- 
nomic Statistics’ 1948 report on statistical gaps was  data on individual in- 
come, expenditure, and savings patterns, data required to analyze “the effect 
of possible [postwar] tax reductions on consumer demand and savings” (U.S. 
Congress, JCER 1948, 20). Income data were collected in the decennial cen- 
sus for the first time in  1940. The 1936 Survey of  Consumer Purchases re- 
mained the most recent large-scale national survey of  income, expenditures, 
and savings until the results of the 1950-51 expenditure survey became avail- 
able in the mid-1950s. The postwar expenditure studies available for tax pol- 
icy decision making during the Korean War  were limited to certain income 
groups and narrow areas in  any single year. Annual Surveys of  Consumer 
Finances, while national in scope, were based on samples too small to permit 
detailed analysis at subnational levels and did not collect asset data. 
Rapid advances in computer technology accompanied by  declining prices 
for given levels of computer performance (Triplett 1989) made computers in- 
creasingly available and affordable research tools. The advent of the computer 
age  in  the  mid- 1950s coincided  with  growing concerns about  horizontal 
equity within the tax system (see Colm and Wald 1952), and provided the first 
practical means of addressing this question. But implementing that tool took 
several years. The first tax burden calculations based on the Statistics of In- 
come microdata were run on these early machines in the early 1960s. While 
the studies were now possible, they were time consuming and costly. 
Third-generation  computing  technology  introduced  in  1965  provided 
much-improved price/performance ratios compared to the earlier technolo- 
gies. At the same time, new large-scale surveys (such as the Survey of Eco- 
nomic Opportunity [SEO]) were undertaken, and both these and existing sur- 
veys  (such as the Current Population Survey [CPS]) became available as 
public-use computer tapes in the late 1960s. Increased computer performance 
characteristics such as speed and memory size began to make research using 
these large surveys feasible, whether the surveys were used alone or in re- 
search linking information among multiple surveys. The first estimates of hor- 
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the  SEO and  the CPS and  advanced computer technology. Continuing in- 
creases in  computer performance make large-scale microsimulation models 
inexpensive and fast enough for daily use in the making of tax policy. 
Advances in statistical techniques and theory reduced the resources needed 
to make statistical matches between individual records in multiple microdata 
files.  The development of  efficient computational algorithms (Scarf  1967) 
made applied multisector general equilibrium  models practical for research. 
Tax  burden measurement depends as well on prevailing economic theory. 
Keynes’s General Theory, introduced in 1936, contributed new ideas for gov- 
ernment fiscal policy that were soon adopted. The preferred public finance 
definition of income against which tax burden should be measured had been 
discussed by Haig in the 1920s but received new attention in Simon’s restate- 
ments in 1938 and 1950. 
A general proof of the existence of competitive equilibrium was first pro- 
vided by  Debreu in  1959. Shortly thereafter, Harberger (1962) presented a 
theory of corporate tax incidence in a general equilibrium setting. The role of 
economic growth and dynamic principles generally in the context of tax inci- 
dence were  first  stated by  Dosser  (1961).  A  separate strain of  general- 
equilibrium models that considered the dynamics of the adjustments between 
general equilibria followed from Dosser’s work. 
Tax  incidence theory determines how the burden of  a tax should be allo- 
cated among economic units; the burden may fall on units other than those 
specified in tax statutes. Incidence therefore is an integral theoretical compo- 
nent of any tax burden measure. Continuing developments in incidence theory 
brought corresponding changes in tax burden measures. One important ad- 
vance was the distinction, drawn by Musgrave in 1951, between two alterna- 
tive ways of thinking about the joint effect of the taxes imposed by the govern- 
ment  and  the  spending financed by  them:  balanced-budget incidence and 
differential incidence. Balanced-budget incidence combines the effect on tax- 
payers of taxation and of government spending on goods and services financed 
by  that taxation. Differential incidence holds government expenditures con- 
stant, and compares one tax structure with another yielding equal revenues. 
The comparison tax structure is typically a flat-rate income tax or a lump- 
sum tax. 
The incidence of  value-added and expenditure or consumption taxes was 
analyzed by  Shoup (1969). A revision of the standard view of  the incidence 
of the property tax was introduced by Mieszkowski (1972), and revisited re- 
cently (Mieszkowski and Zodrow 1984). McLure (1980) provided a theory of 
the incidence of the state corporate income tax. Dynamic concerns, including 
tax incidence over the life cycle and during the course of adjustment between 
two equilibria, have received increasing attention (Hall 1968; Feldstein 1974; 
Kotlikoff and Summers 1979). As recent surveys of this literature show (Mus- 
grave  1985; Kotlikoff  and  Summers  1987), incidence theory  continues to 
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11.3  Representative Taxpayer Studies 
11.3.1  Summary 
Representative taxpayer studies draw together data on the income, con- 
sumption patterns,  and tax payments of  categories of  taxpayers. The cate- 
gories are chosen either for their generality (e.g., the employed head of  a 
family whose spouse is not employed outside the home, with an average num- 
ber of  dependent children), or their specificity (e.g., the class of  taxpayer 
widely believed to be unfairly benefited or harmed by patterns of  taxation). 
Representative taxpayer burden measures may compare only one kind of tax 
payment or all taxes at all levels of government across different categories of 
representative taxpayers. The tax measures may be rate schedules, actual dol- 
lars paid (on average or at the break point of  a tax bracket), or taxes as a 
percentage of  income. The earliest empirical tax burden studies that include 
the full range of  federal, state, and local taxes examine the tax liabilities of 
representative taxpayers. Such a study (Shere 1934) appears first to have been 
conducted as part of a U.K. Treasury Department review of the federal tax 
system in 1934 at the beginning of Morganthau’s era as Secretary of the Trea- 
sury (Blum 1959; Shoup 1972). The methodology in that study is similar to 
Newcomer’s (1937a), whose work is the earliest published modem tax burden 
study to include taxes at all levels. Prior U.S.  analyses typically explored 
instead the circumstances of hypothetical taxpayers, although attempts at em- 
pirical  measures had  been  made  in  Great  Britain since  1756 (Newcomer 
1937a), and a study of  all central government taxes in the United Kingdom 
had recently been completed (Report of the Committee on National Debt and 
Taxation [U.S. Parliament 19271, known as the Colwyn Commission Report). 
Studies in the United States lagged behind in part because income and excise 
taxes played a relatively lesser role in U. S. revenues until the Depression and 
in part because the necessary data simply did not exist. 
Although the representative taxpayer is the oldest form of  empirical tax 
burden measure and has numerous drawbacks, it has not been completely re- 
placed by more recent methodologies. To the contrary, studies of the tax bur- 
den of representative taxpayers continue to the present, most recently entering 
the debate preceding and following the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Reasons why 
this form persists despite its drawbacks are straightforward. For both policy- 
makers and their constituents, examples of the tax burden (however measured) 
of representative taxpayers have obvious intuitive appeal. Moreover, for tax 
provisions that are believed or intended to affect one group more than another, 
these comparisons can be focused on the specific provisions (subject always 
to caveats about the effects of  alternative income definitions and incidence 
assumptions). 
11.3.2  Data 
The early representative taxpayer studies comment on the scarcity of  the 
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comer (in 1937) rely primarily on income data from the Statistics of Income, 
the National Resources Committee, the National Industrial and Conference 
Board, and the study by Loven, Moulten, and Warburton. State tax and prop- 
erty ownership data were readily available only for states for which tax burden 
studies existed (New York, for Shere and Newcomer and Illinois, as well, for 
Newcomer). Expenditure data, such as it was, came from small-scale surveys, 
typically conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Shere notes, 
“The chief deficiency in our present study is the lack of a Census of Consump- 
tion, by  classes of people on basis of age, occupation, size of  income, etc” 
(1934, R-3). Both Shere and Newcomer depend on expenditure distributions 
for subsets of the population based on surveys as much as 15 years old “be- 
cause of  the lack of  statistical information” (Shere 1934, R-3). Absent data, 
they relied on assumptions about likely distributions of consumption and ex- 
penditure across income classes. 
1  1.3.3  Assumptions and Results 
The studies by Shere (1934) and Newcomer (1937) share similar, although 
not  identical, methodologies and  reach  similar conclusions about  the  tax 
structure of  the mid-1930s. The following characterization of  the structure 
and  conclusions of this class of tax burden study is based on Newcomer’s 
study. Reflecting the diversity in the theory of tax incidence and tax shifting, 
tax burdens are calculated under alternative sets of incidence assumptions. For 
most taxes, the incidence assumptions are stable. Personal income taxes gen- 
erally are assumed to be borne by the payer, business net income and capital 
stock taxes are borne by stockholders or owners, stock transfer taxes are borne 
by the taxpayer, and mortgage taxes are born by the individual who mortgages 
the property. Alternative assumptions are made for land taxes, payroll taxes, 
and a category consisting of taxes on improvements, gross receipts, commod- 
ities, motor vehicles,  and  motor fuels. In the alternatives, these taxes are 
shifted to the final consumer, or shifted in various proportions between the 
taxpayer and the final consumer (and the seller or employer, for receipts and 
payroll taxes). The resulting tax burdens are calculated for a family of four in 
each income class, both in dollars and as a percentage of income. Portions of 
representative summary tables from Newcomer’s study are reproduced in 
table 11.3. Federal and state taxes (in the example given, for the state of New 
York only) and incomes are shown separately for families in 10 income classes 
under five sets of incidence assumptions. Taxes also are shown as a percentage 
of income. 
Based on detailed, tax-by-tax analyses, Newcomer concludes that the tax 
system “as a whole is regressive for those income groups not subject to in- 
come and death taxes. The regressive elements appear to be more numerous 
. . .  than the progressive elements at the lower end of the income scale,” while 
the system is “progressive for the income groups subject to income and death 
taxes,” which were the five upper-income groups (1937b, 41). 
Part A of table 11.3  reports estimates of total tax burden, including federal, 358  B. K. Atrostic and James R.  Nunns 
Table 11.3 
A. Total Tax Burden, Federal, State, and Local, Based on Assumptions in Series I (in 9i of income) 
ABCDEFGH  I  J 








State and local total 
Direct 
Shifted 
12.0  10.9  9.8  18.6  17.2  20.8  23.9  31.6  44.3  84.5 
7.4  6.5  5.3  11.7  10.7  10.4  18.0  11.0  23.7  55.6 
4.6  4.4  4.5  6.9  6.5  10.4  5.9  20.6  20.6  28.9 
1.6  1.4  1.3  3.1  2.6  5.9  5.2  16.9  27.0  66.1 
.2  .2  .4  .5  .4  .9  3.7  3.9  14.0  46.6 
1.4  1.2  .9  2.6  2.2  5.0  1.5  13.0  13.0  19.5 
10.4  9.5  8.5  15.5  14.6  14.9  18.7  14.7  17.3  18.4 
7.2  6.3  5.0  11.2  10.3  9.5  14.3  7.1  9.6  9.0 
3.2  3.2  3.5  4.3  4.3  5.4  4.4  7.6  7.7  9.4 
B. Potential Incomes under Different Assumptions of Series I-V  (in $) 
Series: 
I and V  500  1,000  2,000  972  1,944  5,106  4,864  23,591  116,023  1,319,015 
I1 and I11  527  1,033  2,047  972  1,944  5,151  5,095  25,119  119,663  1,382,718 
IV  551  1,068  2,106  986  1,972  5,217  5,266  25,315  121,620  1,397,586 
C. Total Tax Burden, Federal, State, and Local, Based on Assumptions 
in Series I, 11, 111, IV, and V (in $) 
Federal: 
Series I  8  14  25  30  50  300  254  3,999  31,308  872,315 
Series I1  6  9  17  17  30  264  221  3,919  31,085  871,578 
Series 111  6  9  17  17  30  264  221  3,919  31,085  871,578 
Series IV  6  9  17  17  30  264  221  3,919  31,085  871,578 
Series V  8  14  25  30  50  300  328  5,138  46,236  1,110,215 
State and Local: 
Series I  52  95  170  151  284  761  910  3,460  20,123  242,282 
Series I1  73  109  181  133  246  703  1,025  3,760  21,577  284,044 
Series 111  73  109  181  133  246  703  1,025  3,760  21,577  284,044 
Series IV  99  154  260  157  294  825  1,246  4,156  24,534  308,909 
Series V  52  95  170  151  284  761  915  3,676  23,736  329,336 
All: 
Series I  60  109  195  181  334  1,061  1,164  7,459  51,431  1,114,597 
Series I1  79  118  198  150  276  967  1,246  7,679  52,662  1,155,622 
Series I11  79  118  198  150  276  967  1,246  7,679  52,662  1,155,622 
Series IV  105  163  277  174  324  1,089  1,467  8,075  55,619  1,180,487 
Series V  60  109  195  181  334  1,061  1,243  8,814  69,972  1,439,551 
Source: Reproduced from Newcomer (1937b, 28-29). 
Note: Column headings A-J  refer to income classes. Series I-V  assumptions are sets of alternative tax 
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state, and local taxes, for New York families in various income classes, under 
one of the five sets of incidence assumptions. Total tax burden declines from 
12.0% of income for the lowest income families to 10.9% and 9.8% for the 
next two income classes. After rising to 18.6% for the fourth income class, 
tax burden drops to 17.2% in the fifth class before becoming strictly progres- 
sive (from 20.8% to 84.5%) in the upper five classes. Neither the federal nor 
the combined state and local tax burden is progressive in the lower income 
classes, but the federal burden is clearly progressive for higher incomes. The 
pattern of tax burden for state and local taxes is less clear-cut, declining from 
10.4% for the lowest income class to 8.5% for the third, then fluctuating be- 
tween 14.6% and 18.7% over the upper seven income classes. 
11.3.4  Policy Uses 
Both varieties of  representative taxpayer studies entered directly into tax 
policy formation in the mid-1930s and continue their influence to the present, 
as examples from the earlier and current eras illustrate. The report of  the 
House of Representatives on its version of the Revenue Bill of 1934 addressed 
the combined effects of proposed changes in tax rates on earned and dividend 
income on single and married taxpayers with various levels and sources of net 
income and concluded that the proposals would both raise revenue and “at the 
same time distribute the tax burden more equitably” (U.S. Congress, House 
1934, 7). One example of a representative taxpayer comparison, reproduced 
in table 11.4, shows the estimated effects of these proposals on a single man 
and on a married man with no dependents. 
The representative taxpayer concept remains in use, as evidenced by table 
1  1.5, which is from the General Explanation of the Economic Recovery Tax 
Act of  1981 (U.S. Congress, JCT 1981). Tax liabilities under prior law and 
under the act are compared for five categories of  taxpayers in each of  nine 
income levels. 
11.3.5  Problems 
The representative taxpayer approach has several limitations that were well- 
known by  early researchers. Nothing inherent in the representative taxpayer 
approach ensures that the examples typify either all taxpayers or affected tax- 
payers rather than arbitrary choices. Supplemental data on the distribution of 
taxpayers by categories are needed to assess one dimension of representative- 
ness. The representative taxpayer approach also cannot address questions of 
horizontal equity because variations in the income sources, consumption pat- 
terns, and tax burden of  taxpayers within any category cannot be  incorpo- 
rated. In evaluating possible horizontal equity effects of  variations in con- 
sumption patterns, Newcomer (1937b, 7-8)  concluded that “there is no reason 
to suppose, however, that these expenditures will so successfully counterbal- 
ance one another that tax burden will be much the same for all, and no claim 360  B. K. Atrostic and James R. Nunns 
Table 11.4  Comparison of Present and Proposed Tax 
Amount Paid in Taxes ($) 
If  Half Earned Income 
If All Earned Incomea  and Half Dividendsb  All Dividendsb 
Present  Present  Present 
Net income ($)  Law  F’roposed  Law  Proposed  Law  Proposed 
Single male: 
2,000 




























































































































































































can be made that these detailed expenditures  and the tax burden resulting from 
them are typical of  the income group in question. These specific consumption 
taxes are not, however, a large part of  the tax burden for any income group.” 
In general, Newcomer states that, in addition to variations resulting from al- 
ternative incidence assumptions, (1937b, 10) “substantial variations [in esti- 
mated tax burdens] might be obtained by reasonable variations in the assump- 
tions concerning the nature of  income, expenditure, and  property.”  A final 
problem is that the income measure against which tax burden is assessed, 
particularly in earlier studies, generally is a measure of income subject to tax. 
This income measure varies with tax law. In the absence of  additional infor- 
mation  about  all  income sources, taxpayers could change income classes 361  Measuring Tax Burden: A Historical Perspective 
Table 11.4  (Continued) 
If  Half Earned Income 
If All Earned Income'  and Half Dividendsb  All Dividendsb 
Present  Present  Present 

















































































0  0 
0  0 
0  0 
0  0 
0  0 
20  8 
50  46 
80  104 
110  162 
140  220 
220  35 1 
340  502 
500  673 
680  868 
880  1,098 
1,520  1,848 
2,280  2,778 
4,200  4,943 
6,600  7,633 
9,500  10,803 
12,900  14,468 
16,800  18,659 
26,100  28,358 
78,600  82,783 
243,600  253,708 
531,100  551,158 
0  0 
0  0 
0  0 
0  0 
0  0 
0  0 
10  20 
20  60 
30  100 
40  140 
80  235 
140  350 
220  485 
320  640 
440  830 
880  1,480 
1,440  2,310 
2,960  4,275 
4,960  6,765 
7,460  9,735 
10,460  13,200 
13,960  17,190 
22,460  26,490 
70,960  78,915 
223,960  243,840 
491,460  531,290 
Source: Reproduced from U.S. Congress. House. 1934. Report of Mr. Doughton, 6-7.  TheRevenue Bill 
of  1934. 73rd Cong., 2d sess. H. Report no. 704, 6-7. 
aEarned income means wages, salaries, professional fees, or other amounts received for personal services 
actually rendered. 
bDividends from stock of domestic corporations. Same treatment is accorded interest from partially tax- 
exempt government bonds. 
when  the  tax  law  definition of  income changed, without  there  being any 
change in their pretax ability to pay.  Comparisons within income classes of 
the tax  burdens of representative taxpayers under significant changes in the 
law would be inconsistent and misleading. Furthermore, if the proportion of 
total  income subject to tax under a given tax law varies by  income group, 
evaluations of progessivity would be incorrect. Table 11.5  Comparisons of Federal Individual Income Tax Burdens Under Prior Law and under the Act for Tax Year 1984 (Tax Liability [$I)' 
One-earner Married Couple  One-earner Married Couple  Two-earner Married Couple  Two-earner Married Couple 
Single Person  with No Dependents  with Two Dependents  with No Dependents'  with Two Dependents' 
Under  Under  Under  Under  Under  Under  Under  Under  Under  Under 
Incomeb  Prior  the  Reduc-  Prior  the  Reduc-  Prior  the  Reduc-  Prior  the  Reduc-  Prior  the  Reduc- 
($1  Law  Act  tion  Law  Act  tion  Law  Act  tion  Law  Act  tion  Law  Act  tion 
















































































































































Source: Reproduced from U.S. Congress JCT (1981, 26), table IV-4. 
'Includes  the impact of the rate reductions and the deductions for two-earner married couples. Other individual income tax provisions not reflected here are indexing, the 
child care and dependent care credit, charitable contributions for nonitemizers, rollover period for sale of  residence, and changes in the taxation of foreign earned income. 
Assumes that deductible expenses are 23% of  income. 
bAssumes  that all income is wage and salary or self-employment income. 
'Assumes  lesser earning spouse earns 25% of  combined income. 363  Measuring Tax  Burden: A Historical Perspective 
11.4  Aggregate Data Studies 
11.4.1  Summary 
Aggregate data measures of tax burden add two extensions to representative 
taxpayer analysis. The first extension uses estimates of the distribution of in- 
come and “allocators” of tax burden, such as consumption of taxed goods, by 
size class to calculate the distribution of total taxes paid by each income class. 
Comparisons of the distribution of  taxes to the distribution of  income allow 
evaluations of the overall progressivity or regressivity of the tax system. The 
second extension includes all federal, state, and local taxes through aggre- 
gated reports of taxes collected across the Nation rather than relying on a few 
illustrative (although carefully researched) states. (Pechman’s 195  1 compari- 
son of federal income tax burdens in  1941 and 1947 is one of the few major 
aggregate data studies that examines only one tax source.) 
Newly available income distribution data made aggregate data studies pos- 
sible beginning in 1940. Aggregate data studies were used in setting tax pol- 
icy throughout the 1940s and 1950s. These measures continued to be calcu- 
lated through the 1960s (Bishop 1967; Herriot and Miller 1971a, 1971b) and 
continue to be used in making policy at the state level. In federal tax policy 
analysis, they have largely been replaced by microdata studies that allow more 
detailed analyses and estimates of horizontal equity. 
11.4.2  Data 
The unpublished Shere report (Shere 1934) calculated total national tax 
burdens as a proportion of  income and wealth from 1899 to 1933 based on 
national income and wealth series developed by the National Industrial Con- 
ference Board. Distributions of income and wealth, and therefore of tax bur- 
den, were not calculated. 
Pettengill (1940) extended Newcomer’s study of  the tax burden of  repre- 
sentative taxpayers to develop a distribution of total tax burden across income 
classes. The extension depended heavily on a “fortunate coincidence” (1940, 
62) in the years covered by Newcomer’s study and by the National Resources 
Committee report on  the distribution of  consumer incomes in the United 
States, 1935-36 (Baird and Fine, 1939). 
Colm and Tarasov (1941), another early aggregate data study, notes that 
actual statistics on the desired data rarely exist for the categories required for 
the analysis. Lacking these data, researchers use estimates based on other data 
sources to  distribute estimates of  total  taxes  and  income  across  income 
groups, where the estimated totals themselves might be based on relatively 
small samples. “Yet it is frankly admitted that this is an experimental approach 
that requires further refinement. It is hoped that the 1940 Census of Popula- 
tion, in  conjunction with a more detailed analysis of  the  1939 income tax 
returns, will permit more accurate statistics on the distribution of  incomes 
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Consider,  for example,  only the basic  data sources listed by  Colm and 
Tarasov (1941). (The lists of the supplementary general material and special 
topics-often  specific state studies-are  at least as long.) The National Re- 
sources Committee provided data on consumer incomes and expenditures and 
on the structure of the American economy. The Commerce Department pro- 
vided data on state income payments and national income and other financial 
statistics of state and local governments, along with the wonderful miscellany 
of the statistical abstract. Estimates of federal, state, and local revenues were 
provided by the Treasury, along with data on individual and corporate income 
tax returns through the Statistics of  Income. The Social Security Board pro- 
vided information on median wages of covered workers. The BLS provided 
data on urban consumer purchases. 
The creation of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report and its Sub- 
committee on Economic Statistics reflected widespread awareness of the frag- 
mented state of  data needed for policy-making. By 1949, when Musgrave et 
al. (1951) studied the distribution of  tax burden in  1948, the situation was 
little improved, with the available evidence “discouragingly scarce” ( l), and 
in some cases imposing “limitations [that] are appalling” (8). As Pechman 
noted in commenting on the debate about the Musgrave study, the available 
data were at best “recalcitrant,” with “no officially recognized annual distri- 
butions of income and consumption by income classes, let alone tax distribu- 
tions which depend on these basic data” (Pechman 1951, 204). Income data 
were taken from the  1949 Survey of  Consumer Finances, with expenditure 
totals derived as residuals from reported income less income taxes and sav- 
ings. Expenditure distributions, required for the distribution of  sales and ex- 
cise taxes, were derived from BLS budget studies for a limited number of 
cities. 
Long-standing reconciliation problems among survey data (such as the Sur- 
vey of Consumer Finances), administrative record data (such as the Statistics 
of  Income),  and national account estimates provided  grounds for much of 
Tucker’s (1951, 1952) criticism of the Musgrave study. The limitations of the 
available consumer budget  studies, and  an alternative proposal for dealing 
with them, were a second dimension of the criticism. 
11.4.3  Assumptions and Results 
Disagreements about appropriate statistical sources also reflected the lack 
of  a consensus on the appropriate definition of  income for tax burden mea- 
sures. The Haig-Simons definition of income (consumption plus change in net 
worth) had not yet emerged as the standard definition in applied work, al- 
though the concept had long been accepted in theory. In practice, the consid- 
erable limitations of data on assets and imputed income (important for rural 
residents, homeowners, and for recipients of fringe benefits) made it difficult 
to implement this concept. An alternative income concept, proposed by Pech- 
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concept used for tax purposes. Taxable income corresponded more closely to 
a money income concept, and had  the advantage of being readily available 
from Statistics of Income. 
The state of tax incidence theory was no more settled than that of income 
theory. It had long been understood that assumptions about the ultimate inci- 
dence of  corporate, sales, payroll, and excise taxes clearly affected conclu- 
sions about the distribution of  tax burden. But the theory provided mixed 
guidance on which taxpayers actually bear the burden of the various taxes. At 
the same time, it was recognized that tax burden could not be measured inde- 
pendent of incidence assumptions (see, e.g., Colm and Tarasov 1941,2). The 
incidence of taxes remained undetermined in theory in part because the tasks 
of  specifying the full workings of  a general equilibrium solution were then 
near the frontiers of economic theory (see, e.g., Oakes 1942). Reflecting the 
ambiguous state of theory, tax burden studies presented conclusions based on 
a series of  alternative incidence assumptions (see, e.g., Newcomer 1937b; 
Colm and Tarasov 1941; Pettengill 1940; Adler 1951; and Pechman 1951). 
Typically, differences among studies were attributable as much to fundamen- 
tal differences in income concept and data sources as to differences in  inci- 
dence assumptions. (See, e.g., the analysis by  Musgrave et al. 1951 of dif- 
ferences among their results and those of Colm and Tarasov  1941 and Adler 
1951.) 
Although the studies vary in their specific burden measures, they tend to 
agree on  the general shape of  the tax burden distribution before and after 
World  War 11.  That structure is roughly U-shaped: regressive at the lowest 
income levels, approximately proportional over middle incomes, and progres- 
sive at higher income levels. 
The results of aggregate data studies are generally summarized in two sets 
of  comparisons. The first comparison is between the percentage of  total in- 
come received by each income class and the percentage of total taxes paid by 
that class (e.g., Colm and Tarasov 1941, 28; and Musgrave et al. 1951, 26). 
This information sometimes is used, together with data on the distribution of 
households across income classes, to evaluate the equity of  the tax system 
through Lorenz curves or Gini coefficients (as do Pettengill 1940; Adler 1951; 
Pechman 1951). When such comparisons are made across tax regimes, their 
interpretation can be complicated if the income distributions change in  ways 
that cause the Lorenz curves to cross (see, e.g., Pechman 1951). The second 
comparison is of taxes paid as a percentage of income across income classes. 
This comparison reveals the progressivity of  the tax system. Both compari- 
sons are contained in table 11.6, which reproduces the summary table from 
Musgrave et al. (1951). 
11.4.4  Policy Uses 
Federal tax policy, as it responded to the array of problems facing the nation 
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Table 11.6  Distribution of Tax Payments by Income Groups: Summary' 
item 
Spending Unit income Brackets (thousands of  dollars) 
Under 1  1-2  2-3  3-4  4-5  5-7.5  7.5 andover  Total 
Amounts (in $ million): 
I. Federal 
2. State and local 
3. All levels 
Percent of yield total: 
4. Federal 
5. State and local 
6. All levels 
Percent of  income: 
7. Federal 
8. State and local 
a. State 
b. Local 
9. All Levels 
Addenda: 
10. income received 
1  1. Percent of in- 

















2,243  5,392  6,682  5,079  6,754 
1,123  2,131  2,512  1,755  2,061 
3,366  7,523  9,194  6,834  8,815 
5.1  12.3  15.3  11.6  15.4 
8.3  15.7  18.5  12.9  15.2 
5.9  13.1  16.0  11.9  15.4 
16.2  18.6  19.0  19.3  21.1 
8.1  7.3  7.1  6.7  6.4 
3.9  3.7  3.7  3.5  3.4 
4.2  3.7  3.5  3.2  3.0 
24.3  25.9  26.1  26.0  27.6 
13,850 29,037  35,207 26,283 31,953 
7.0  14.8  17.9  13.4  16.3 


























196,6  19 
100.0 
100.0 
Source: Reproduced from Musgrave et al. (1951). 26. 
Note: Details may not add to totals because of  rounding. 
'Standard  assumptions throughout. 
bIncludes income imputed under standard corporation assumption 
ies. Aggregate data studies (except for Tucker 1951) tended to similar conclu- 
sions despite reliance on a diversity of  data sources, time periods, assump- 
tions,  and methodologies. All concluded that the federal tax  structure was 
highly progressive, primarily because corporate and personal income taxes 
and death taxes that applied to the upper end of the income distribution offset 
regressive federal excise and payroll taxes. The total tax burden, including 
state and local taxes, was found to be less progressive, with taxpayers in the 
lowest income brackets sometimes found to bear a higher ratio of  taxes to 
income than middle-income taxpayers (see Adler  195  1; Pettengill 1940; as 
well  as Musgrave  1952,  1953; Colm and Wald  1952; and Pechman  1951 
above). Increasing the progressivity of the tax structure, either by raising stat- 
utory income tax rates for upper-income brackets or raising their effective tax 
rates through base broadening, was a consistent goal of federal tax policy. The 
choice among alternative revenue  sources to balance budget  deficits, hold 
down inflation, and pay  for wars was made not only on the basis of  their 
relative yield and administrative feasibility, but also on the basis of their rela- 
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World War I1 financing took account of the conclusions of early tax burden 
studies that the federal income tax was the most progressive of  the federal 
government’s tax instruments. Congress raised rates and lowered exemptions 
to the federal income tax, turning the income tax into a broad-based tax. In 
the early 1950s, policy recommendations  in the Economic Report of the Pres- 
ident (195  1) addressed the growing tax burden and problems in measuring it 
when prices and incomes were growing rapidly. The Joint Committee on the 
Economic Report shared those concerns. It proposed quelling inflationary ten- 
dencies induced by financing the Korean War by selectively raising the excise 
taxes that would most affect middle- and upper-income taxpayers: “If tax bur- 
dens are so great as to shock the sense of justice or equality, some way is found 
to avoid them or to pass them on into higher prices,” and therefore, specific 
tax proposals “should take cognizance of the fact that the people in the lower- 
income brackets . . .  are already overburdened . . . by the increasing cost of 
living and the present level of  taxes,” and new taxes should be targeted “to 
absorb  surplus purchasing  power where it exists” (US. Congress, JCER 
1951,7-8). 
11.4.5  Problems 
The data available through the 1950s and the aggregate data approach did 
not allow measures of  horizontal equity within income classes to be calcu- 
lated. Horizontal equity was an issue because of the postwar growth in sources 
of  untaxed income that would tend to increase the variability of tax burdens 
within an income class. Pechman (1958) noted this problem in a discussion of 
Goldsmith’s conclusion that pre- and postwar income distributions were sim- 
ilar. The 1959 Tax Revision Compendium, a summary of congressional hear- 
ings  (U.S.  Congress, House Committee on Ways  and Means  1959), also 
raised the question of  horizontal equity. Despite the growing concern, how- 
ever, there were few alternatives available for empirical work. Data on the 
taxes, income, and consumption of  individuals and families, together with 
ways to link these data would have been required to construct the necessary 
tax burden measures. The income measure would need to be independent of 
the current tax law, as well. The unit of interest for equity comparisons, usu- 
ally the household or family unit, was rarely the unit for which data was avail- 
able. In particular, income tax data were presented on the basis of filing units, 
generally different from the family or household survey units underlying ex- 
penditure data and other income surveys. 
Additional questions about the internal consistency of assumptions on the 
incidence and timing of taxes were raised by Prest (1955). Many of the incon- 
sistencies reflected difficulties inherent in applying a theoretical framework 
that is essentially a long-run general equilibrium framework to the analysis of 
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11.5  Microdata Studies 
11.5.1  Summary 
Microdata studies represent one of the two major directions of  current tax 
burden research. Microdata studies improve upon aggregate data models in 
their greater capability to model variations in tax burden across individuals 
within an income class (i.e., to address horizontal equity), their relative inde- 
pendence from the tax base defined in current law, and their ability to describe 
results by  demographic and nontax economic characteristics of  policy inter- 
est. The first tax microdata model, developed at Treasury in the early 1960s, 
was used to assess tax burden in constructing President Kennedy’s 1963 re- 
form proposals. Microdata models are widely used in current policy analysis 
by the Office of Tax Analysis (OTA) of the Treasury Department and the Joint 
Committee on Taxation, among others. The OTA  simulation model and its 
relationship to new data developments and limitations are discussed in section 
1  1.7  below. 
1  1.5.2  Data and Technology 
The need for data on individual economic units in order to measure the 
equity of tax burden among individuals with similar incomes but differential 
access to exclusions and differential patterns of  consumption, income, and 
savings had been noted as early as 1951 (Pechman), but neither the data nor 
the means to analyze them became available until the early 1960s. 
Data 
The heavy data demands that tax burden studies make were partially met 
by the growing availability of tax and survey microdata. Serious gaps, how- 
ever, persisted. A 1964 study conducted for the Subcommittee on Economic 
Statistics by T. Paul Schultz examined the statistics available on the size dis- 
tribution of personal income in the United States and presented a series of 
recommended changes (U.S. Congress, JEC  1965a). A number of those rec- 
ommendations were directly relevant for measuring the income component of 
tax burden. Several of  those proposals addressed the lack of data on wealth 
and nonlabor income, a serious omission for any attempt to construct a com- 
prehensive income measure. The upcoming 1970 census could be modified to 
collect net wealth data and also more finely detailed categories of  personal 
income than before. The annual Survey of  Consumer Finances also was an 
obvious potential vehicle for collecting data on net worth of consumer units, 
particularly in light of the panel character of the data collection in  1961-63. 
Finally, demographic and financial data could be collected from an expansion 
of the individual income tax form. 
Subsequent hearings and collections of  views by  statistical agencies and 
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tailed  and  timely  data  (U.S.  Congress,  JEC  1965a,  1965b,  1966,  1967, 
1969). Schultz’s recommendation for using new computer technology to link 
data collected by various statistical agencies was repeated in the later hearings 
and emerged as a proposal for a central statistical service center. When the 
problem of maintaining personal privacy under such a center was raised, pro- 
ponents were confident that stringent safeguards could enhance rather than 
reduce the confidentiality of  government statistical records (U.S. Congress, 
JEC  1967). In  an increasingly computerized era, however,  public concern 
about privacy was growing as evidenced in the 1969 hearings before the Sub- 
committee on  Economic Statistics.  The perception  that  an  Orwellian Big 
Brother was possible created a firestorm about the upcoming  1970 census, 
particularly when coupled with debates over proposals by the statistical agen- 
cies that citizens should be compelled, under threat of jail or fine, to respond. 
In the face of public opposition, the proposal for a central statistical service 
center fell by  the wayside. Neither of the two remaining proposals bore fruit 
in their original form. Rather than being expanded, the Survey of Consumer 
Finances was soon discontinued. Concerns about respondent burden and pri- 
vacy limited expansions of the federal income tax forms. 
A new wave  of  detailed surveys on income, wealth, poverty, and move- 
ments among income classes was begun in the 1960s to address these data 
needs. Public-use versions of  the Statistics of  Income individual return data 
were available from the early 1960’s. The 1967 Survey of Economic Oppor- 
tunity  collected information on  assets and  nonwage  income  from  30,000 
households. Public-use microdata tapes for the monthly CPS were first made 
available for March 1968. The CPS collected demographic and income infor- 
mation on individuals and also on their households. Longitudinal surveys, 
such as the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the series of  Na- 
tional Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) of age cohorts of men and women, were 
begun. 
Despite  these  new  surveys,  none  collected  income,  consumption,  and 
wealth in a single, nationally representative, large-scale statistical source. To 
the contrary, data availability in general worsened until recently. The 1963- 
64 Survey of the Financial Characteristics of  Consumers remained the most 
recent source of wealth data on an individual basis until the Federal Reserve 
Board repeated the survey in 1983 and (on a limited basis) 1986. The current 
sample size is an order of magnitude below that of the CPS. The Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP) meets the need Schultz articulated 
in  1964 for detailed demographic and economic data over time in a broad- 
based national survey, and includes one-year-apart surveys of wealth in its 
longitudinal framework for 1983-84  (see McNeil and Lamas 1989). Needs 
for detailed data on the receipt and cost of fringe benefits by  individual tax- 
payers, stated by Pechman (1951) and repeated periodically (see U.S. Con- 
gress, JEC  1965b; Triplett 1983) remained largely unmet.  For example, al- 
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retirement and health benefits and repeated similar questions in May 1983 and 
May 1988, it did not collect either the amount of employer contributions for 
these benefits or the incidence of other benefits. Consumption and expenditure 
data were provided at intervals of  a decade (by the Survey of  Consumer Ex- 
penditures conducted for the BLS in 1960-61 and 1971-73)  until the current 
series of  ongoing Consumer Expenditures Surveys began in 1980. Reliance 
on some method of  record linking or of  imputing data missing on the basic 
data source remains an essential component of  current tax burden metho- 
dology. 
Computing Technology 
Developing a sample of tax returns that would permit detail and accuracy 
as well as speed and  flexibility in modeling the burdens of  alternative tax 
provisions required computer technology. The Internal Revenue Service had 
joined with the Census Bureau in 1955 to purchase a computer. The Statistics 
of Income samples were then put on computer tapes, but the format could not 
be readily adapted to different analytical uses outside specific Statistics of In- 
come applications. Researchers, IRS advisory groups, and tax policymakers 
recommended creating a microdata file for tax policy research. The first mi- 
crodata computer tape of a sample of individual tax returns for use in exam- 
ining tax burdens was  not produced until February 1962. The data were a 
100,OOO-record subsample of  the 429,000 tax returns used to produce the 
1960 Statistics of  Income tabulations. The  subsample was  produced and 
stored on computer tape at the request of the Office of Tax Analysis (OTA) of 
the U.S. Treasury. The computer technology available, while it made the proj- 
ect feasible at all, was costly and cumbersome. The data file required 50 reels 
of tape, the model required four to six weeks of programming time for each 
set of complex changes in tax provisions, and simulations consumed as much 
as eight hours of  computer time, with total cost of  a model run exceeding 
$1,000 (in 1962  dollars). 
Computing cost was not the sole resource constraint. Techniques that made 
statistical matches among records from multiple surveys in  attempts to fill 
gaps in the individual surveys typically required even greater programming 
and computing capabilities than analyses of single microdata files. Because of 
the resources required, microdata models tended either to rely on a sole data 
source (as did the OTA model) or to be long-term research products describing 
a period a year or more in the past. Research commissioned by the OTA in the 
mid- 1970s dramatically reduced  the  computer time  needed  to  produce a 
matched file that had  desirable statistical properties. The standard optimal 
technique required five weeks for one of the six steps in the match; the new 
technique (Barr and Turner 1978) required six hours. Documenting all the 
matching, weighting, imputing, extrapolating, and tax calculating programs 
that produced the final tax model data base demanded commitment of  scarce 
staff resources. 
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ing services that microsimulation require increasingly affordable. The micro- 
simulation model has become an integral part of tax policy formation for both 
the OTA and the Joint Committee on Taxation, and remains a major evaluation 
tool for policy analysts outside the federal government. 
Statistical Innovations 
An  important innovation for tax burden research was  instituting efficient 
sampling techniques in the Statistics of Income program. When the wartime 
conversion of the income tax to a broad-based tax dramatically increased the 
number of tax returns, Statistics of Income’s prewar practice of tabulating a 
relatively high proportion of  returns (e.g., one out of  four returns in  1926) 
quickly became cumbersome (Natrella 1966). Improved sampling produced a 
manageable number of returns for analysis, and the sample size continued to 
drop as sampling technique became increasingly sophisticated. 
11.5.3  Studies Based on Microdata 
Studies Based on One Microdata Source 
Annual public-use versions of the Statistics of Income sample were made 
available to other researchers beginning with the 1962 sample (Natrella 1966). 
Pechman’s 1965 study of the change in tax burdens under the Revenue Act of 
1964, the earliest published study using microdata, was based on a sample of 
100,OOO federal tax returns. With access to the details of individual records, 
tax liability could be calculated from the individual records rather than from 
income class averages. Variations in definitions of income could also be ex- 
plored. 
The tax return sample increased modeling capabilities, but room for im- 
provement remained. Returns were available only for individuals required to 
file tax returns under the current tax law, but information on those not required 
to file was needed to model the effects of tax proposals that made major mod- 
ifications to the Internal Revenue Code. Modeling capabilities also were con- 
strained by the limited information recorded on tax returns. Demographic data 
were not recorded on tax returns, although policy questions often asked about 
the equality of tax burdens across demographic groups. There was no way to 
join tax returns of related individuals to form real families, although the unit 
of policy interest was generally the family rather than the individual. Treasury 
testimony (in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance 1962) and Pech- 
man (1965) reflect these limitations. Treasury’s adjusted gross income mea- 
sure and Pechman’s taxable income measure both depended on income items 
reported on the tax return, rather than on a broader Haig-Simons income mea- 
sure. 
A series of microdata models of tax burden followed these seminal studies 
in the 1960s and early 1970s. The new studies drew on technical innovations 
and new microdata sources. Bossons developed “A General Income Tax Ana- 
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introduction acknowledges the integral role of  the computer in the develop- 
ment and practical use of that model. The raw data, 412,000 tax returns, ini- 
tially were stored on 16 reels of tape before similar returns were aggregated 
into a more tractable 19,000 groups. Bossons’s study describes its methodol- 
ogy and data sources clearly and provides the 200 pages of  computer code 
required to convert the raw data into final printed tables. This documentation 
appears to be the first public offering of  such material to other potential ana- 
lysts. The pragmatic effect of the model on Canadian tax policy was to make 
it feasible to examine the effect of a series of  alternative rate schedules and 
thereby to “obtain a significantly lower rate schedule that would raise suffi- 
cient revenue and which would come closer to meeting the commission’s ob- 
jectives” than the original, hand-calculated rate schedule (Bossons 1967, 2). 
Estimates of tax burden by income, age, occupation, and sex were calculated 
for alternative tax schedules. 
Researchers interested in measuring U.S. tax burden applied similar meth- 
odologies to new data sources. A new National Survey of Consumer Expend- 
itures and Income for  1960-61,  conducted by the BLS, was the basic data 
source in an aggregate data study by Bishop (1967) comparing tax burdens in 
1961 and 1965. Herriot and Miller (1971a, 1971b) relied on tabulations from 
the 1968 CPS as the basic data source in their aggregate study, supplemented 
by  distributions of  consumption, wealth, and taxes from the  1960-61  BLS 
Expenditure Survey, the  1960 Survey of  Consumer Finances and the  1963 
Survey of  Financial Characteristics of  Consumers, and the Statistics of  In- 
come. 
A  series of  studies exploited the underlying microdata of  new  surveys. 
Browning and Johnson (1979) conducted a tax burden study using the 47,000- 
household CPS microdata from March 1975. Longitudinal data from the PSID 
for 1967-77  (including income and asset data, federal tax payments, and fam- 
ily and other demographic data) were used by  Ott and Dittrich (1981) to ex- 
amine changes in tax burden under the Revenue Acts of  1969 through 1978. 
Berliant and Strauss (1983, 1985) make use of an 11-year series of public-use 
Statistics of Income tax data files, with several hundred thousand observations 
in each year’s file (about twice the size of the OTA’s tax file). The computa- 
tional resources required by  the size of  the data sets and the complexity of 
their burden calculations were large enough both for comment and discus- 
sion of  methods for reducing the size of  the computations. The NBER also 
maintains a microdata model based on Statistics of  Income data (Feldstein 
1987). 
Tax  burden models based on a single underlying microdata source share 
several limitations. Models based on tax records have little information on 
income from nontaxable sources and no information at all on those not re- 
quired to file under current law. The taxpaying unit generally is not the family 
or spending unit whose relative welfare is being evaluated under alternative 
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units are not collected on tax returns. The models based on nontax survey data 
are better able to combine data to form appropriate family units and to analyze 
the tax burden of alternative demographic groups, but typically have less pre- 
cise information about the taxes actually paid by the surveyed units. Similar 
problems during the 1960’s were encountered by researchers interested in de- 
veloping  size distributions of  income to measure poverty and  analyze its 
causes (Budd and Radner 1969). 
Studies Based on Multiple Microdata Sources 
Exact and statistical linkage of several microdata files were proposed as a 
method of  providing the information missing from any single survey. The 
movement toward matching of  data sets was partially motivated by  the de- 
creasing cost and  increasing speed at which  such tasks could  be  accom- 
plished.  Prices for  second-generation computers had  been declining since 
1962, and the introduction of  third-generation machines in  the mid-1960s 
lowered the prices of  older machines as well as providing new  technology 
whose own quality-adjusted  price also continued to decline over time (Triplett 
1989). Exact-match experiments conducted in the  1970s produced, for ex- 
ample, the 1973 three-way exact match of the IRS, CPS, and Social Security 
Administration records. Confidentiality problems, however, made the result- 
ing data difficult for most researchers to use whether outside government or 
within. Statistical linkage of tax return records from the Statistics of  Income 
and  the CPS was  first accomplished not  for calculating tax burden but for 
measuring poverty (Budd and Radner 1969), although the applicability of the 
technique to improved tax research was clearly stated. The importance of ad- 
vances  in  computer  technology to  statistical linkages was  also  explicitly 
noted. 
The first tax burden study to use statistically linked microdata was Pechman 
and Okner (1974), based on the 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity and 
the  1966 Statistics of  Income public-use sample. The Survey of  Economic 
Opportunity had observations on about 30,000 households, and the Statistics 
of  Income sample contained about 87,000 returns. Updated versions of  the 
original Survey of Economic Opportunity-Statistics of Income data, with the 
CPS replacing the Survey of Economic Opportunity, continued to be used to 
analyze the distribution of tax burdens (Pechman 1985 and 1986). The OTA 
constructed statistically matched data for its tax model in  1976 and used that 
model in preparing tax reform proposals in  1977. Statistically linked micro- 
data from the CPS and the Statistics of Income became its standard tax model 
data base. 
11  S.4  Assumptions and Results 
Tax burden measures based on microdata models generally show the overall 
tax structure from the 1960s through 1980s to be roughly proportional, de- 
spite differences among the models in data sources, theories of tax incidence, 374  B. K. Atrostic and James R.  Nunns 
and estimation methodologies. The proportional tax structure contrasts with 
early representative taxpayer and aggregate data studies that showed a  U- 
shaped structure. 
An important advantage of  microdata models over aggregate data models is 
that tax burden estimates can be calculated to assess horizontal equity. Such 
calculations, made by Ott and Ott (Commission to Revise the Tax  Structure 
1973), Pechman and Okner (1974), and Pechman (1985), show substantial 
variations in burden among households with similar incomes. Tables 11.7 and 
11.8 reproduce tables from Pechman and Okner that use microdata to assess 
the degree of horizontal equity in the tax system. Means, standard deviations, 
medians, and quantile variations in effective tax rates are calculated for two 
alternative sets of incidence assumptions. The calculations are made sepa- 
rately for each population income decile. The degree of variability of effective 
tax rates varies by income class under both sets of  incidence assumptions. 
Effective tax rates for demographic and economic subgroups, such as the aged 
and nonaged and homeowners and renters, are calculated in table 11.8 for a 
detailed series of  taxes under the same two sets of  incidence assumptions. 
Table 1  1.9 reproduces a table from the Commission to Revise the Tax Struc- 
ture (1973) showing horizontal equity by  income class based on  frequency 
distributions  of effective tax rates by income class. 
Table 11.7  Mean and Median Effective Federal, State, and Local Tax Rates and 
Measures of Variability of Tax Rates under Incidence Variants lc and 
3b, by  Population Decile, 1966 (in percentages) 
Variant lc  Variant 3b 
Population  Standard  Quartile  Standard  Quartile 











16.8  30.1  15.3  6.1  27.6  35.9  23.0  6.6 
18.6  14.6  17.8  5.3  24.8  16.3  23.6  4.9 
21.6  19.6  21.3  4.1  26.0  12.6  25.0  4.2 
22.6  8.8  22.1  3.8  25.9  10.5  25.2  3.7 
22.8  6.5  22.6  3.2  25.8  7.3  25.4  3.2 
22.7  5.5  22.6  2.8  25.6  5.8  25.6  2.6 
22.1  6.6  22.4  2.7  25.5  5.5  25.3  2.4 
23.1  5.9  22.7  2.5  25.5  5.2  25.4  2.2 
23.2  5.4  22.9  2.4  25.1  4.9  25.1  2.2 
26.2  10.2  24.5  3.9  25.0  8.6  24.6  2.5 
Source: Computed from the 1966 MERGE data file. For an explanation of  the incidence variants, 
see Table 3-1. Reproduced from Pechman and Olkner (1974), 67. 
Note: Variant lc is the most progressive and 3b the least progressive set of  incidence assumptions 
used in this study. 
5ee  text for the definition of the standard deviation and the quartile deviation. 
bIncludes  only units in the sixth to tenth percentiles. 375  Measuring Tax Burden: A Historical Perspective 
Table 11.8  Effective Federal, State, and Local Tax Rates for Various Demographic and 
Economic Groups under Incidence Variants lc  and 3b, 1966 (in C) 
Personal 
Sales and  Property and 
Group and  Individual  Corporation  Property  Excise  Payroll  Motor Vehicle  Total 
























































































































.3  24.8 
.3  25.9 
.2  27.6 
.2  25.9 
.3  25.2 
.3  25.6 
.2  25.3 
.2  26.9 
.3  25.4 
.3  26.0 
.3  24.3 
.3  25.5 
.2  31.6 
.2  30.2 
.3  21.9 
.3  26.8 
.3  23.8 
.3  25.2 
Source: Computed from the 1966 MERGE data file. For an explanation of  the incidence variants, see 
table 3-1. Reproduced from Pechman and Okner (1974), 72. 
Note: Variant  Ic is the most progressive and 3b the least progressive set of  incidence assumptions used 
in this study. 
11  S.5  Policy Uses 
Tax  burden studies based on microdata models have generally concluded 
that the prevailing tax structure was roughly proportional to income for most 
of the population, with the Federal income tax the major progressive compo- 
nent. (Browning and Johnson [1979],  who found the present system highly 
progressive, are exceptions  .) Proportionality of taxes and progressivity of the 376  B. K. Atrostic and James R. Nunns 
Table 11.9  Frequency Distribution of Effective Tax Rates for Selected Income Classes 
under Alternative B and Present Law, 1971 (households  in thousands) 
3,Ooo-4,999  5,000-6.999  10,000-11,999  50,000-99.999 
Present  Alternative  Present  Alternative  Present  Alternative  Present  Alternative 






























































2284.00  1750.92 
4359.29  661.78 
902.44  640.64 
.OO  712.51 
.OO  694.13 
.OO  534.22 
.OO  612.63 
.OO  579.72 
.OO  866.65 
.OO  632.58 
.OO  285.71 
.oo  57.77 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  4.59 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
60.10  120.89 
643.49  54.85 
3811.53  196.81 
3269.93  227.73 
248.60  437.12 
.OO  703.06 
.OO  722.58 
.OO  1008.46 
.OO  839.72 
.OO  1101.17 
.OO  889.72 
.MI  785.73 
.OO  472.01 
.oo  4.59 
.OO  42.11 
.OO  117.59 
.oo  13.15 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
14.17  2.53 
1.14  .58 
53.33  1.38 
137.44  .I2 
245.24  .23 
2126.21  .23 
3902.95  .35 
1238.60  4.94 
18.03  8.14 
.OO  6.32 
.OO  2.89 
.OO  28.49 
.OO  35.76 
.OO  80.15 
.OO  78.16 
.OO  79.28 
.OO  79.80 
.OO  85.65 
.OO  64.40 
.oo  44.81 
.OO  32.21 
.OO  41.72 
.OO  12.37 
.OO  2.08 
.OO  .23 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
.oo  .oo 
































Source: Reproduced from Commission to Revise the Tax Structure (1973), 182-83. 
Note: Total households in each class differ slightly due to rounding. 
federal income tax  remain relatively stable conclusions across studies and 
across alternative incidence assumptions within a study. Horizontal inequities 
are found within income classes, attributable to specific features of the Inter- 
nal Revenue Code (additional exemptions or exclusions, for example) and to 
variations in income sources and consumption patterns. 
The policy implications that follow from these conclusions are to broaden 
the tax base, lower tax rates (especially at lower incomes), and eliminate ex- 377  Measuring Tax  Burden: A Historical Perspective 
cise taxes, thereby increasing horizontal equity while achieving the desired 
vertical distribution of the tax burden. These conclusions are common to most 
of the microdata studies (Browning and Johnson 1979 again are an exception) 
as well as common to prior studies based on aggregate data (see the 1959 Tax 
Revision Compendium [U.S. Congress House Committee on Ways and Means 
19591; e.g., as well as Musgrave et al. 1951). Not surprisingly, the major tax 
reform proposals of the last decade have reflected these conclusions. 
The first Treasury tax model was immediately put to use in preparing Pres- 
ident Kennedy’s  1963 Tax  Message. That Message proposed, in “the most 
urgent task confronting the Congress in  1963,” to reform the federal tax sys- 
tem to provide stimulus to the economy and to minimize “inequities and com- 
plexities that affect similarly suited taxpayers in wholly different ways,” while 
making the largest proportionate reduction “to those at the bottom of the eco- 
nomic ladder” (U.S. Congress, House 1963, 154-55).  Table 3 of  that Mes- 
sage compares distributions of tax burden among income classes under then- 
current law and under the proposed law. Since 1963, tables produced from the 
OTA and the Joint Committee on Taxation microsimulation models have been 
used extensively in the consideration of all major tax bills. 
11.5.6  Problems 
Despite their advances over aggregate data models, microdata models still 
are limited with respect to data, economic theory, statistical theory and prac- 
tice, and computer technology. The limitations reduce the models’ abilities to 
address policy questions in ways that inform the debate rather than diverting 
the debate to the merits of the estimates they generate. 
Theoretical problems, unresolved with respect to aggregate data models, 
persist in microdata models. Even in the definition of income, where consen- 
sus in principle on the Haig-Simons definition of  income has a long history 
(see Musgrave 1985), differences in interpretation arise in  practice. Thus, 
both Pechman and  Okner (1974) and Browning and Johnson (1979) adopt 
Haig-Simons income definitions, but differ on, among other things, which 
transfer income items are included. The studies differ also in their assump- 
tions on the shifting of taxes, an area where there is somewhat less consensus 
in the literature. The absence of a consensus on incidence complicates evalu- 
ations of the models. Whalley (1984) presents a series of calculations showing 
the sensitivity of  tax burden measures to alternative incidence assumptions 
and income measures similar to Pechman and Okner (1974), on the one hand, 
and to those of Browning and Johnson (1979), on the other. A comparison of 
pairs of tax burden measures shows that the choice of  shifting assumptions 
alone can determine whether the tax structure appears to be progressive or 
regressive. Similarly, the choice of income concept alone can determine pro- 
gressivity or regressivity. Other assumptions, such as the choice of time pe- 
riod (single periods or lifetimes) over which tax burden ought to be measured, 378  B. K. Atrostic and James R. Nunns 
and the economic unit (e.g., families, households, or tax returns) also directly 
affects the conclusions. 
The statistical matching of two microdata sets raises a host of unresolved 
statistical questions about the properties of  the resulting matched data set. 
See, for example, the discussion about the Survey of Economic Opportunity 
and the CPS linkage underlying Pechman and Okner (1974) (Okner 1972a, 
1972b; Sims 1972; Peck 1972; Budd 1972), and a parallel discussion of link- 
ages between other microdata sets (Okner 1974; Sims 1974). Treasury spon- 
sored further research on statistical problems with merged data files (Kadane 
1978) and also sponsored new research on alternative linking techniques with 
better statistical properties (Barr and Turner  1978). Policy needs unmet by 
existing data sets outweighed criticism of  matched data sets, however, and 
microsimulation models linking data from multiple sources rapidly became 
standard in tax policy and other policy settings (Barr and Turner 1978). Re- 
search has continued to improve the statistical properties of  such data sets 
with missing data (see, e.g., Kalton 1983; Rodgers 1984; David et al. 1986; 
Rubin 1987; and Little and Rubin 1987). 
Beyond the problems of  statistical matching, microdata models encounter 
additional statistical problems. The subgroup of  interest for a specific policy 
problem frequently is a subgroup for which the underlying sample is too small 
to make accurate estimates. For example, policies are frequently evaluated for 
their effect on the poor or the elderly, or on the recipients of one kind of  in- 
come versus another, while the original sample was not designed to represent 
those subgroups. Another problem is that analyses are typically wanted for 
the current period or for a federal budget period, while data become available 
only with a lag (e.g., 1986 tax return data will become available in 1988). The 
data must be extrapolated to current and future dollar levels through implicit 
or explicit modeling of growth and change. 
11.6  Applied General Equilibrium Studies 
11.6.1  Summary 
Applied general equilibrium models developed over the last 15 years into 
the second major tool for analyzing tax policy and its effects on the distribu- 
tion of  tax burden. Practical implementation of these models was spurred by 
formal proofs of  the existence of  competitive equilibrium under quite general 
conditions and the development of  efficient computing algorithms, together 
with computer speed and capacity to make their solutions practical as well as 
possible. Applied general equilibrium models quickly added features of  the 
tax system and grew increasingly disaggregated. The appeal of these models 
for analyzing tax policy is the appeal of general, rather than partial, equilib- 
rium  analysis itself.  The  general equilibrium approach provides a  formal 
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programs and their joint effect on economywide allocation, distribution, and 
growth questions. Tax  burden analysis and the tax incidence literature both 
are generally couched in general equilibrium terms. Much of  the empirical 
analysis used in the policy debate was nevertheless set in partial equilibrium 
terms (see, e.g., Musgrave et al. 1951; Pechman 1985; Cilke and Wyscarver 
1987; U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office 1987). 
The first relatively large-scale applied general equilibrium models were de- 
veloped in the early 1970s (Shoven and Whalley 1972; Shoven 1976). The 
evolution of applied general equilibrium models is recounted elsewhere (Ful- 
lerton, Shoven, and Whalley 1978; Shoven and Whalley 1983; Piggott 1985). 
A disaggregated general equilibrium model of  the United States was devel- 
oped by Fullerton, Shoven and Whalley (1978) with support provided in part 
by the OTA. These models have been applied to a series of tax policy prob- 
lems ranging from general distortions induced by taxation (Shoven and Whal- 
ley 1972; Fullerton and Gordon 1983) to the analysis of specific reform pro- 
posals  such  as  switching to  a  consumption  tax  (Fullerton,  Shoven,  and 
Whalley 1983). A subgroup of general equilibrium models has been used to 
examine the dynamic properties of alternative tax policies such as the duration 
of the adjustment process and the distributions of tax burdens at intermediate 
stages during the  process (Feldstein  1978; Auerbach  and  Kotlikoff  1983; 
Auerbach, Kotlikoff,  and  Skinner  1983). The general equilibrium models 
themselves have incorporated some dynamic elements (Ballard et al. 1985). 
11.6.2  Data 
The data demands of  the general equilibrium models range more broadly, 
but require less detail than, those of microdata models. Income, consumption, 
and tax data for individuals are required, but generally are aggregated to in- 
come classes. Additional data not required by the aggregate and microdata 
models include an input-output matrix for producers and a transition matrix 
linking producer goods to consumer goods, as well as data on investment, 
government purchases, and foreign trade. The data are assembled for a single 
year or an average of years. Applied general equilibrium models share data 
reconciliation problems common to other approaches to measuring tax bur- 
den, including resolving differences among alternative sources of similar data 
and differences between theoretical concepts and actual measures. 
The data gaps that limit microdata models also limit applied general equi- 
librium models. In particular, the lack of wealth data and of the income from 
it make it difficult to construct models of  intertemporal choices between con- 
sumption and savings that accurately reflect particular time periods. 
1 1.6.3  Assumptions and Conclusions 
The existence of computable applied general equilibrium models coincided 
with a new wave of literature on theoretical tax incidence (Shoven 1976; Ro- 
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Feldstein  1977; McLure and Thirsk  1975a, 1975b; McLure 1975). The ap- 
plied framework provided an opportunity to quantify the tax burden resulting 
from existing incidence theories and also provided the means to calculate the 
consequences of alternative theories. 
A long-run perspective on the process of adjusting to changes in tax laws 
can be constructed from sequences of equilibria that add current savings to the 
capital stock and income of future periods. This sequence also can be used to 
generate a sense of the length of  the adjustment process to the final equilib- 
rium and to calculate the incidence and size of  the tax burden on  various 
groups during the process. A parallel literature has developed on the dynamic 
properties of alternative reforms, such as switching from a consumption to an 
income tax, and vice versa (Eaton and Rosen 1980; Bernheim 1981; Summers 
1981; Auerbach and Kotlikoff 1983; Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Skinner 1983). 
11.6.4  Policy Uses 
Applied general equilibrium models make several significant contributions 
to tax burden measurement and tax policy formation. The structure of  the 
models provides a formal mechanism for applying alternative tax incidence 
assumptions about the full range of taxes and for analyzing the effect of taxes 
on real income, economic efficiency, and growth. Applied general equilibrium 
models permit changes in tax revenues under alternative tax structures to be 
separated from the  distortions in  economic efficiency  caused by  taxation. 
Measures of excess burden under alternative tax structures and measurement 
concepts can be calculated and compared (Auerbach and Rosen 1980; Auer- 
bach 1985; Diewert 1985). 
Conclusions on the distribution of  tax burden based on applied general 
equilibrium models have influenced tax policy in  a more indirect way  than 
have conclusions based on microdata models. General equilibrium results cur- 
rently make their mark on policy by influencing economists’ views, but gen- 
erally are not a standard tool for analysis either in Congress or at the Treasury. 
The models have several problems that make them less suitable for day-to-day 
policy analysis than microdata models. 
11.6.5  Problems 
Computational requirements for the models, although dropping at the same 
time computing costs are falling, remain large enough that researchers still 
search for ways to reduce them (Ballard et al.  1985). Because consumption 
time is partially a function of  the dimensionality of  the model, the need to 
minimize time counterbalances the desire for more disaggregated models. The 
current version of  the Ballard et al. model, for example, has  12 consumer 
categories, 15 consumer goods, and 19 producer goods, plus taxes, govern- 
ment, and exports. This is much more detailed than the two-by-two models of 
Harberger and Diamond, but remains below the level of disaggregation avail- 
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general equilibrium models remain too cumbersome to be practical in policy 
analysis. Further, they lack the flexibility of  microdata models in  terms of 
examining the tax burden of  specific population subgroups as need arises. 
Moreover, like representative taxpayer and aggregate data measures, they ig- 
nore variability in income, consumption, and taxation within subgroups. 
The models also depend on strong assumptions about the specific forms of 
utility and production functions. The forms are chosen as much for their tract- 
ability as for their theoretical properties, with Cobb-Douglas, constant elastic- 
ity of substitution, and fixed coefficients forms common. (An alternative ap- 
proach is based on econometric estimations of  flexible functional forms for 
utility and production functions; see Jorgensen 1984.) Elasticities are chosen 
from the empirical literatures, which are themselves often in  disagreement 
about appropriate theory, estimation methodology, and data (see, e.g., discus- 
sions of “the” elasticity of labor supply in Borjas and Heckman 1979; Haus- 
man  1981; and Killingsworth 1983). Incidence theory plays as important a 
role in the conclusions reached in general equilibrium models as in microdata 
models, and is no more resolved. A final concern about applied general equi- 
librium models is that test statistics to assess their reliability have not been 
developed and sensitivity analyses of the effect of alternative assumptions re- 
main relatively uncommon (Whalley 1984). 
11.7  OTA Microsimulation Studies 
The Office of Tax Analysis in the Department of the Treasury maintains a 
microsimulation model that it uses to estimate and evaluate distributional,  rev- 
enue, and economic impacts of individual income taxes. A similar model is 
maintained by the staff of the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation. 
During the recent tax reform process, the model was used to examine the 
effects of thousands of proposed changes to the Internal Revenue Code. The 
issues examined ranged from the effect of changes in a single provision to the 
interaction among sets of provisions and also included analyses of the distri- 
butional effects of proposed changes. Additional features of the model and its 
data base allowed these issues to be  analyzed on a family as well as a tax 
return basis, provided distributional consequences based on several alterna- 
tive income measures, and estimated the impact on the number of tax filers. 
Finally, the data base contained income and population measures independent 
of  the current law,  allowing comparisons of  alternative proposals against a 
common measure and also allowing the modeling of provisions that applied 
to components of income not taxable (and therefore not reported on tax forms) 
under the prereform law. The simulation model, the data base developed and 
used during the tax reform process, and the construction of  a Haig-Simons 
definition of income are described in detail in  Cilke and Wyscarver (1987), 
Nunns (1987), and Nelson (1987). The model itself is documented in Wys- 
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The series of tax burden measures considered during the tax reform process 
included estimates of the proportion of  families with tax increases and tax 
decreases, of percentage tax reductions for families by income category and 
itemizing status, as well as percentage tax reductions by income class (U.S. 
Treasury, Division of Tax Research 1985a, 1985b; U.S. Congress, JCT 1986). 
Additional tax burden considerations were shown in comparisons of the num- 
ber of  tax returns in  each income class that  would show  selected income 
sources, adjustments, and deductions under then-current law and under re- 
form proposals. The distribution of tax liability under prior law and under the 
Tax  Reform Act of  1986 for these tax burden measures are given in tables 
11.10-11.13  below. 
The choice of  income measure clearly affects both the estimated distribu- 
tion of taxes by income class and the effect of reform proposals. Table  11.10 
presents distributions based on three alternative income measures. Adjusted 
gross income (AGI), a somewhat expanded income measure (labeled MEI, 
for modified expanded income), and family economic income (FEI,  a measure 
closer to the Haig-Simons concept than AGI or MEI) are considered in turn. 
The associated tax unit concepts also vary among the measures. AGI and ME1 
are calculated on a return basis, while FEI  is calculated on a family basis. AGI 
is the measure readily  available from tax  returns, while ME1 is a measure 
developed and  used  by  the Joint Committee on Taxation and  FEI  is  used 
by  OTA. 
Tables 1  1.1  1-1  1.13 demonstrate the variety of analytical tabulations the tax 
model makes possible. The distribution of  family economic income and of 
Table 11.10  Individual Tax Liabilities under 1988 Law, Before and After the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986, by Economic Income of Families, Modified Expanded Income 
of Returns Age 16 and over, and AGI of Returns (1983 levels of income) 
Economic Income of 
Families  AGI of  Returns  ME1 of Returns Age 16 + 
Income 
Class  Prior  TRA  %  Prior  TRA  %  Prior  TRA  % 
($1 ,OoOs)  Law  Law  Change  Law(%)  Law(%)  Change  Law  Law  Change 
~ 
0-10  1.9  1.7  -15.6  1.2  1.0  -17.7  .5  .4  -24.3 
10-15  4.8  4.3  -14.6  3.6  2.8  -25.8  1.7  1.2  -34.1 
15-20  6.5  6.4  -6.5  5.3  4.9  -13.0  3.2  2.7  -18.9 
20-30  16.5  16.4  -4.9  14.1  13.8  -6.7  10.5  10.2  -7.1 
30-50  29.5  29.8  -3.5  28.9  28.6  -5.9  26.3  26.3  -4.8 
50-100  19.2  20.2  .2  22.5  23.7  .O  31.0  32.3  -.8 
100-200  8.6  8.7  -3.7  8.9  9.3  -.l  10.6  11.2  .1 
200 +  12.9  11.9  -12.3  15.4  15.9  -1.8  16.1  15.5  -8.5 
Total  100.0  100.0  -4.7  100.0  100.0  -4.7  100.0  100.0  -4.7 
Negative income  .I  .5  .1  .o  .o  .o  .1  .3  .I 
Addendum: 
Source: Reproduced from Nelson (1987), 96. 383  Measuring Tax Burden: A Historical Perspective 
one of its components, corporate income, can be compared in terms indepen- 
dent of current tax law in table 11.11. In addition, the table shows distribu- 
tions of individual income tax and individual and corporate tax liabilities that 
held before the Tax Reform Act of  1986. The major components of adjusted 
gross income and taxable income (including deductions, adjustments, and ex- 
emptions) under 1983 and  1988 law are shown for each AGI cless in table 
11.12. Both the number of returns and dollar amounts are given. Many of the 
same AGI and taxable income components under 1983 and 1988 law are given 
in table 11.13, but are distributed according to FEI rather than AGI. In addi- 
tion, table  11.13 presents distributions of  FEI components that  are not in- 
cluded in  AGI, such as food stamps, welfare benefits, health and  medical 
insurance, and the net rental value of owner-occupied housing. 
Two  current policy concerns place new emphasis on the revenue and tax 
burden consequences of single tax provisions and sets of provisions, in addi- 
tion to the overall tax burden consequences of current law. First, the process 
leading to the Tax Reform Act of  1986 involved evaluating the distributional 
consequences of alternative packages of rate reductions and base broadening 
proposals. The initial goal (U.S.  Treasury 1984) of distributional  and revenue 
neutrality evolved into a final goal of equitable distribution of the tax reduc- 
tions that had been achieved (U.S.  Congress, JCT  1987). To  achieve these 
goals and maintain them through postreform proposals for changes in the law 
requires knowledge of  the changes in the distribution of  tax burden result- 
ing  from  changes in  individual provisions  and  from  interactions  among 
Table 11.11  Distributional Comparisons of Corporate and Family Economic 
Income, and Individual and Corporate Income Tax Liabilities 
(1983 levels, 1988 law) 
Distribution of  1988 
he-TRA Law Tax Liabilities 
Family 
Economic  Corporate  Individual  Individual and 
Income  FEI (%)  Income (%)  (%)  Corporate (%6)' 



















































Source: Reproduced from Nelson (1987), 88. 
'Assumes  corporate income taxes are distributed in proportion  to  corporate income in  family 
economic income. Table 11.12  All Returns: Gross Income, Adjustments, Deductions, Exemptions, Taxable Income, and Taxes under 1983 and 1988 Law 
(1983 level and distribution of income; no. of returns in thousands, amounts in $ millions) 
Business Income  Capital Gains in 
Wages and Salaries  Interest  Dividends in AGI  or Loss  AGI  Pensions in AGI 
AGI  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of 
Class*  Returns  Returns  Amount  Returns  Amount  Returns  Amount  Returns  Amount  Returns  Amount  Returns  Amount 






























































































































































































































































76,851 Table 11.12  (Continued) 
Net Rents, 
Royalties, 
Partnership, etc.,  Social Security  Other Gross  Employee  Two-Earner 
and Farm Income  Benefits in AGI  Income  Total Gross Income  Moving Expense  Business Expense  Deduction 
AGI  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of 
Class*  Returns  Amount  Returns  Amount  Returns  Amount  Returns  Amount  Returns  Amount  Returns  Amount  Returns  Amount 
(ow  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19)  (20)  (21)  (22)  (23)  (24)  (25)  (26)  (27) 
1983 law: 
Under 10  3,047  (28,006)  1,849  (9,186)  34,594  149,347  199  263  501  1,352  679  241 
10-15  1,329  (529)  1,649  1,084  13,907  179,090  296  450  717  1,642  1,195  645 
15-20  1,354  (490)  2,266  2,378  10,836  195,461  215  309  882  1,705  1,754  1,248 
20-30  2,480  (362)  5,046  5,466  16,466  424,814  347  720  1,728  3,225  5,116  4,827 
30-50  3,070  (16)  6,089  5,521  15,358  605,551  324  1,054  2,163  4,428  7,063  8,727 
50-100  1,645  3,821  1,719  2,992  4,293  281,389  123  625  749  1,997  1,704  2,485 
100-200  446  5,034  249  1,223  623  85,224  27  22  1  98  526  129  217 
200 and over  137  7,407  75  99  1  161  88,639  3  31  19  157  27  56 
Total  13,508  (13,141)  18,941  10,470  96,240  2,009,516  1,533  3,671  6,857  15,033  17,666  18,445 
1988 law: 
Under 10  3,066  (18,193)  3  13  13,470  (9,491)  35,116  169,060 
10-15  1,331  74  15  19  7,568  1,021  13,969  182,763 
15-20  1,358  51  157  157  7,236  2,608  10,850  198,750 
20-30  2,480  608  1,482  2,418  13,112  8,563  16,474  433,676 
30-50  3,070  1,800  1,793  4,539  13,687  11,597  15,363  623,679 
50-100  1,644  7,421  615  1,637  4,144  5,916  4,293  300,065 
100-200  446  8,142  111  39  1  610  2,569  623  98,409 
200 and over  137  11,041  33  124  160  2,096  161  121,302 
Total  13,531  10,943  4,210  9,298  59,988  24,879  96,850  2,127,702 
continued Table 11.12  (Continued) 
Other  Total 
IRAS  Adjustments  Adjustments  AGI  Amount of 
AGI  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  Non-  Standard  No. of  Itemized  No. of  Value of 
Class*  Returns  Amount  Returns  Amount  Returns Amount  Returns  Amount  itemizers  Deduction  Itemizers  Deductions  Exemptions  Exemptions 
No. of  Amount of  Excess  Total 



















200 and over 
Total 
608  1,021 
977  1,996 
1,250  2,638 
2,892  6,567 
4,960  12,336 
2,496  6,288 
361  953 
107  260 





































2,556  2,464  5,434  34,593  143,914  32,105 
1,082  3,194  5,814  13,907  173,276  10,931 
663  3,679  6,563  10,836  188,899  6,965 
1,335  8,233  16,674  16,466  408,141  7,137 
2,286  10,605  28,804  15,358  576,749  3,021 
2,185  3,364  13,573  4,293  267,816  318 
991  462  2,890  623  82,333  33 
414  125  917  161  87,722  7 



















1,682  35,116  167,538  33,379 
1,562  13,969  181,395  11,594 
1,716  10,850  197,236  8,143 
4,104  16,474  429,954  9,378 
4,721  15,363  619,479  5,047 
2,619  4,293  297,682  630 
1,053  623  97,416  46 
430  161  120,890  10 

















































































337,569 Table 11.12  (Continued) 
Alternative 
Taxable Income  Tax Before  Minimum Tax  Earned Income  Net Income Tax 
Taxable Income  Less ZBA  Credits  Credits  (AMT)  Credit (EIC)  Liability 
AGI  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of 
Class*  Returns  Amount  Returns  Amount  Returns  Amount  Returns  Amount  Returns  Amount  Returns  Amount  Returns  Amount 







































112,771  19,428 
131,241  13,387 
148,359  10,716 
322,522  16,373 
455,734  15,328 
212,122  4,278 
67,088  620 
74,522  160 










53,156  19,403 
94,647  13,397 
117,710  10,716 
272,667  16,371 
405,938  15,328 
198,047  4,277 
65,064  620 
74,001  160 










18,907  9,206 
12,883  12,652 
10,738  16,698 
16,394  43,794 
15,353  77,692 
4,287  51,455 
622  22,323 
161  30,421 



















234  14 
581  7 
690  4 
1,311  18 
1,850  77 
1,341  108 
848  51 
975  20 
7,829  299 
118  30 
377  2 
386  5 
74 1  9 
966  30 
546  57 
336  43 
314  18 



























































































Source: Reproduced from Nunns (1987), 104-7. 
'Adjusted gross income (AGI) as defined under 1983 law. Table 11.13  Tax Return Income, Additional Items in Economic Income, and Tax Items for Families in 1983 (1983 tax law, 1983 level and 
distribution  of income: no. of families in thousands, amounts in $ millions) 
Business Income  Capital Gains in 
Wages and Salaries  Interest  Dividends in AGI  or Loss  AGI  Pensions in AGI 
Economic  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of 
Income Class'  Families  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount 






























































































































69,814 Table 11.13  (Continued) 
Net Rents, 
Royalties, 
Partnership, etc.,  Other Gross  Employee  Two-eamer 
and Farm Income  Income  Total Gross Income  Moving Expenses  Business Expense  Deduction  IRAs 
Economic  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of 
Income Class’  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount 































































































































continued Table 11.13  (Continued) 
Addendum: 
Adjustments to  Total Social  Nontaxed SS and 
AGI under 1983  Security and RR  RR  under 1988 
Other Adjustments  Total Adjustments  AGI  Law  Retirement  Tax Law 
Amount of 
Economic  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  Unreported  No. of  No. of 
Income Classa  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Income  Families  Amount  Families  Amount 






























































































































157,210 Table 11.13  (Continued) 
Unemployment  Workmen’s  Pension and Profit  Health and 
Compensation  Compensation  Veterans’ Benefits  Food Stamps  Welfare Benefits  Sharing Plans  Medical Insurance 
Economic  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of 
Income Class’  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount 
(OOO)  (41)  (42)  (43)  (44)  (45)  (46)  (47)  (48)  (49)  (50)  (51)  (52)  (53)  (54) 
Under LO  906  1,331  297  553  612  1,209  3,437  3,516  2,820  6,863  2,211  749  2,282  1,758 
10-15  1,537  3,024  423  920  459  1,207  2,838  3,201  1,698  4,879  3,712  2,083  4,072  3,996 
15-20  1,587  3,666  513  1,071  479  1,576  1,962  2,221  1,215  3,526  4,759  3,826  5,201  5,848 
20-30  1,983  5,107  1,044  2,779  847  3,124  1,786  2,029  1,262  3,974  10,421  13,040  11,293  14,347 
30-50  1,218  2,776  1,454  4,181  925  3,685  738  1,037  682  2,396  16,208  33,491  16,842  27,480 
50-100  617  1,354  732  2,204  471  1,658  133  249  174  677  9,825  33,498  9,838  20,636 
100-200  55  133  41  120  43  255  7  13  4  19  1,019  6,056  1,006  2,282 
200 and over  5  8  14  39  4  18  0  0  0  0  274  4,377  266  613 
Total  7,907  17,399  4,518  11,868  3,839  12,731  10,900  12,266  7,856  22,333  48,428  97,120  50,800  76,960 
continued Table 11.13  (COfltiflUd) 
Real Pretax 
Military Benefits  Other Untaxed  Earnings on Life  Corporate 
and Fringe  Employer  Less: Taxable  Earnings on  Insurance, IRAs  Economic  Less: Dividends 
Benefits  Contributions  Pensions  Pension Funds  and Keoghs  Income  before Exclusion 
Economic  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of 
Income Class’  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount 




































































































































( 13,7  19) 
(9,492) 
(12,788) 
(49,587) Table 11.13  (Continued) 
Less: Dividends of  Real Net Capital  Inflation  Inflation 
Tax Exempt  Pension and  Less: Capital  Gains Except  Adjustment for  Adjustment for  Excess Tax 
Insurance Funds  Gains in AGI  Securities  Interest Received  All Other Income  Depreciation  Interest 
Economic  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of 
Income Class'  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount 






















































































































continued Table 11.13  (Continued) 
~~ 
Total Adjustment 
from 1983 Law  Real Net Rental 
Value of  Owner  Other Economic  AGI to Economic  Economic Income 
Occupied Housing  Income  Income  of Families  Amount of 
No. of  Excess  Total 
Economic  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  Non-  No. of  Itemized  No. of  Value of 
Income Class’  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  Families  Amount  itemizers  Itemizers  Deductions  Exemptions  Exemptions 






























































































































236,097 Table 11.13  (Continued) 
Alternative 
Minimum Tax  Earned Income  Net Income 
Taxable Income  Tax before Credits  Credits  (AMTI  Credit (EIC)  Tax Liability 
Economic  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of 





































1,642  348 
5,140  817 
9,236  1,204 
29,356  3,047 
72,609  5,862 
85,049  4,516 
29,145  770 
43,133  275 

































































Source: Reproduced from Nunns (1987), 125-28. 396  B. K. Atrostic and James R.  Nunns 
provisions. Second, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget constraint imposes 
a search for revenue neutrality for expenditure proposals that the postreform 
era suggests should also be distributionally neutral. Consequently, the tax 
model is being called upon to aid in examining the changes in tax burden of 
proposed financing of expenditure provisions, such as extending Medicare to 
include catastrophic health care, that previously would have been unlikely to 
entail explicit tax policy concerns. 
Data availability and frequency have improved markedly since the tax bur- 
den studies of  the 1930s. But for some policy questions, the necessary data 
still do not exist,  and for other questions, the data are available only from 
several separate surveys and not jointly. The series of  tax burden measures 
that could be considered during the tax reform process depended on data avail- 
ability. The OTA model uses statistical matching techniques to join informa- 
tion from several surveys together to form synthetic data files. For example, a 
statistical match joined  similar records in the Statistics of  Income and the 
CPS. Where data are available only through smaller surveys, such as con- 
sumption data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, imputations are made 
to records in the  larger surveys. The matching  and  imputation techniques 
themselves can introduce problems, as discussed in the context of microdata 
problems. Another problem is that those data that do exist rarely coincide in 
their reference periods and availability. One or more of the data sets usually 
must be extrapolated forward to a common base year, in addition to extrapo- 
lations needed to move the final tax model database forward to the current 
year and to the federal budget period,  a period roughly five years into the 
future. 
Several of the gaps are highlighted in the process of creating a Haig-Simons 
income concept. The process requires information on income, wealth, con- 
sumption, and taxes for each unit, family, or individual in the tax model data- 
base  (Nelson  1987). Among  the necessary  data,  wealth data are the most 
scarce both in frequency of collection and size of sample (see Lipsey and Tice 
1989). In this, gaps in data for tax policy needs coincide with one of the major 
statistical gaps noted by the current American Economic Association report 
on U.S. economic statistics (Juster 1988). For example, in the 1983 Survey of 
Consumer Finances was the first national survey of the income, wealth, and 
financial behavior of households since the 1963 Survey of Financial Charac- 
teristics of  Consumers. The  1983 Survey of  Consumer Finances surveyed 
5,400 households, a sample size sufficient to generate reliable national esti- 
mates of wealth components and distributions (Juster 1988; Avery, Elliehau- 
sen, and Kennickell 1988), but small compared to the 75,000-observation Sta- 
tistics  of  Income  and  120,000-observation CPS  samples.  Moreover,  the 
Survey of Consumer Finances sample size for cross-classifications  of interest 
for tax policy (e.g., specific income sources for households by  age and in- 
come groups) quickly becomes very small. The CPS provides information on 
income and transfer payments for a very  large sample but has well-known 397  Measuring Tax Burden: A Historical Perspective 
nonresponse patterns that reduce the usable sample, especially for high in- 
comes (David et al. 1986). Furthermore, some taxed income may not be suit- 
able for inclusion in a Haig-Simons income measure, such as nominal capital 
gains and pensions. 
The SIPP data have many more observations than the Survey of Consumer 
Finances, but tend to show lower wealth totals, with the shortfalls occurring 
in sources (such as small business equity, closely held corporate equity, real 
estate other than own home, etc.) of considerable policy interest. Tax return 
data in the Statistics of Income provide fairly detailed data on income that is 
taxable under current law, but not on untaxed income. Moreover, tax returns 
lack the details on the composition of  that income and the rates of return it 
reflects that are necessary components of indirect wealth calculations. 
Another important gap is data on employee benefits. Federal tax policy 
excludes many employee benefits from taxable income in exchange for im- 
posing regulations intended to extend those benefits to more, usually lower 
income, workers. Policymakers need to know whether the benefits accrue as 
intended and whether workers and employers trade them for other benefits or 
higher money  wages.  As  papers presented at  a previous conference have 
shown (Triplett 1983), such data are scant. Some data are available on benefit 
characteristics and costs together with information on the employer and em- 
ployee (Wood  1988), but the level of aggregation is high (one-digit industry 
and three occupational classes) and neither financial characteristics of the em- 
ployer nor gther demographic and economic characteristics of the worker are 
available. Similarly, there are some household surveys that collect information 
on the incidence of fringe benefits (the CPS and SIPP occasionally do so), but 
usually lack employer expenditures and most characteristics of the employer. 
For some current policy concerns, the Haig-Simons income concept yields 
disconcerting tax burden results. Consider, for example, comparing the tax 
burdens of  the elderly and the nonelderly. Under the Haig-Simons accrual 
concept, pensions enter income of the worker as the employer contributes to 
the pension fund and as the fund ems  a return on contributions and do not 
enter the income of the retiree when the pension benefit is received. Tabula- 
tions of  income and tax burden for the elderly alone, as would be prepared, 
for example, for alternative proposals changing the personal exemption levels 
available to the elderly, produce theoretically correct but intuitively anoma- 
lous results. Retirees whose income sources are taxable pension income are 
shown as having tax liability but no current income. 
Capital gains present the same problem. Gains are included in economic 
income when they accrue, but tax is paid when the gains are realized, which 
often occurs in a period different from the accruals. Taxpayers in any period 
who realize capital gains appear to have tax liabilities out of  proportion to 
their measured income. 
Changes in the underlying demographic structure of the population present 
challenges to tax policy as well as to social policy. The inadequacies of exist- 398  B. K. Atrostic and James R. Nunns 
ing data for describing changes in forms of family units, work patterns over 
the life cycle, intrafamily resource allocations, and so forth, make the avail- 
able measures of tax burden no better than any of the traditional measures of 
household income, wealth, or savings. 
11.8  Conclusions 
The course of tax legislation throughout the last 50 years consistently con- 
sidered and was shaped by  conclusions based on tax burden measures. As- 
sessments of  where the tax burden falls determined the form taken by  tax 
increases or decreases (e.g., the choice between excise and income taxes) and 
influenced the structure of specific taxes (e.g., in linking personal exemptions 
and standard deductions to the poverty level in the federal income tax or in 
apportioning rate changes among tax brackets). 
The history of empirical tax burden measurement reflects the broad outlines 
of developments in economics over the same period. Theoretical and meth- 
odological advances, new  computing technologies, and  new  sources and 
kinds of data all produced new measures of tax burden. At the same time, tax 
burden measures have theoretical foundations only as firm as the economic 
theories and the corresponding structures of  partial, general, and  dynamic 
models that underlie them. In this theoretical arena, much remains open for 
further research, whether in terms of incidence theory (in microdata models, 
general equilibrium models, or dynamic models) or the choice among broader 
welfare measures (in general equilibrium models). Computational algorithms 
for solving general equilibrium models are becoming more efficient, and the 
introduction of  duality theory to general equilibrium modeling reduces the 
number of required computations. Current computing technology makes mi- 
crosimulation models of  increasingly detailed analyses a standard feature of 
the policymakers’ ordinary tool kit. 
Pragmatic constraints to microsimulation models stem primarily from the 
limits of  data availability and  the  reliability of  imputation and  statistical 
matching and extrapolation techniques employed to compensate for those lim- 
its. These constraints, shared with other economic and social policy applica- 
tions, will apply for the near future. Improved tax burden measures for policy 
uses are more likely to come from advances in incidence and measurement 
theory that allow stronger inferences from a static supply of data. 
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Comment  Martin H. David 
The Framework for Burden Studies 
Atrostic and Nunns undertake an ambitious survey of the methodology and 
empirical basis for understanding the “burden of taxation .” My remarks com- 
plement their review and focus on four topics: scope, evaluation, error, and 
new  data  requirements.  Let  me  begin  by  reviewing  their  definitions  and 
framework. Early in the discussion the authors state: 
A tax is a compulsory payment to the government from which the taxpayer 
recevies no direct benefit. . . . Payment of taxes, through lower factor in- 
comes or higher product prices, reduces a taxpayer’s real income. Tax bur- 
den measures attempt to quantify this decrease in utility and  to evaluate the 
decrease against a measure of ability to pay.  . . . Taxation also imposes 
administrative and compliance costs. 
Table  11C.  1 relates this definition to other kinds of  payments and receipts 
that are relevant to understanding the welfare of individuals. The table consid- 
ers both taxes and transfers. The distinction between coercive and voluntary 
payments is paralleled by  a division of transfers into entitlements (automatic 
receipts) and means tested (or conditional receipts). The quid pro quo corre- 
sponding to payment or receipts is classified by the nature of the correspond- 
ing change utility that derives from change in consumption bundles available. 
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Table 11C.1  Payments Relevant for “Burden” Analysis 
Nature of Transaction 
Quid pro quo  Compulsory  Voluntary 
(Direct Benefit 
or Cost)  Payment  Receipt  Payment  Receipt 
None  1. “Pure” taxation 
Nonexclusive  2. Property taxes  Contributions  5. In-kind transfers 
Exclusive  3. FICA  4. EITC  Consumption  Factor sales 
6. Cash transfers 
The case mentioned by Atrostic and Nunns, no change in real goods and ser- 
vices is what I will call category 1, one of three important cases. The others 
are cases in which the payment generates benefits for large numbers of per- 
sons, that is, nonexclusive benefits (category 2), and cases in which the pay- 
ment generates a benefit that is specific to the individual making payment, or 
exclusive benefits (category 3). 
It is important to note that a substantial part of government finance corre- 
sponds to entries other than category 1, which the authors use as their defini- 
tion of  taxes. Atrostic and Nunns point out that “tax burden” studies have 
generally been limited to a study of income, property, sales, and payroll taxes, 
numbered 1-4  in table 1  1C.  1. They mention that property taxes and payroll 
taxes may be “benefit taxes” under some ideal system of equilibration in the 
marketplace that includes “voting with your feet” and complete certainty of 
lifetime endowments. 
The separability of  taxes,  transfers,  and expenditures in the analysis of 
“burden” does not really work: the existence of tax features such as EITC and 
personal exemptions make it clear that some aspects of  the compulsory tax 
system have similar effects on the consumer’s budget constraint to elements of 
the cash transfer system. A complete understanding of  the vertical equity of 
the  behavior of  the fisc would  clearly be  incomplete without considering 
transfers. Problems of integrating tax and transfer systems are significant (and 
have  occupied analysts in several of the major pieces of tax legislation over 
the past 20 years). 
Some Features of the Tax System Substitute for Voluntary Expenditures 
For example, tax deductibility of charitable contributions matches “tax ex- 
penditures” to the outlays of consumers in their voluntary budgeting of con- 
sumption. These points suggest a first difficulty in burden analysis: 
Problem 1. “Pure” tax burden studies are too limited. The burden of reve- 
nue raising must account for the benefits (costs) of  other kinds of  taxes and 
transfers. Debate on the size of public sector requires an understanding of the 
burden of both financial and real consequences of government activity. 
An accepted understanding of “burden” among economists today is welfare 410  B. K. Atrostic and James R. Nunns 
loss. Measures of welfare loss are based on three conceptual foundations. The 
most carefully articulated is that an analytic relationship exists between the 
raising  of  revenues  by  altering after-tax prices  and  the  dead-weight loss 
(DWL) of the system. That is, the excess of the rise in the expenditure func- 
tion over the yield of the tax system. Deriving burden in this framework re- 
quires an explicit measure of parameters of the utility function. 
The  second  and  third  conceptual foundations of  dead-weight loss  were 
more prominent in discussions of political economy a generation ago, but deal 
with problems of public choice. A collective agreement must be reached on 
whose utility function is to be used in burden analysis. That is, some charac- 
teristics of taxpayers create heterogeneity of tastes. (For example, large fami- 
lies will consume more food and housing than small families with a given 
income. This difference in behavior has been considered relevant to taxation 
and is recognized in the existence of personal exemptions, tax rate schedules, 
and standard deductions.) Heterogeneity in tastes can be recognized by  in- 
cluding relevant characteristics of taxpayers in the estimation of utility param- 
eters. The converse is that characteristics that are not considered relevant for 
discrimination in the design of  taxkransfer systems must be disregarded in 
estimating the parameters of  the utility function (and ignored in policy mak- 
ing). Musgrave (1959) implicitly recognizes this idea in his definition of hor- 
izontal equity. 
The third conceptual framework is related to the second. Vertical equity 
implies an understanding of the marginal utility of income (wealth of endow- 
ment) as income increases. Marginal utility must decline, and it must decline 
more than some critical rate to assure that the socially desired tax system is 
not regressive in relation to income (endowment). 
Problem 2. Burden relates to utility and dead-weight loss. Measurement of 
burden reflects an implicit consensus on relevant heterogeneity, which  be- 
comes embedded in parameter estimates. Subsistence and satiation imply that 
the marginal utility of increases to the endowment must fall. 
We  note that none of  the tables presented by  Atrostic and Nunns shows 
burden  in  this  utility  sense.  (Two  difficulties have  been  critical: develop- 
ing acceptable equivalence scales and modeling intertemporal choices of con- 
sumers.) 
Implementation of  these notions of  burden measurement requires data on 
endowments, spending behaviors,  and  income-producing behaviors of  the 
population (aggregated into decision units). This creates the third major prob- 
lem for burden studies. 
Problem 3. Empirical data on the joint distribution of endowment, leisure, 
consumption, and lifetime accumulation are needed to estimate utility func- 
tions and to determine the distribution of burden in the population. 
The various methods used to estimate burden described by  Atrostic and 
Nunns overcome the three problems of  scope, utility, and data requirements 
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Representative Taxpayer Methods 
The representative taxpayer approach ignores all three problems. It assumes 
values for the taxpayer’s endowment and deductively applies a tax rule to 
demonstrate an outcome variable. The approach survives because it gives an 
intuitive understanding. It fails to be  informative because (a) there are no 
measures of the importance of the cases simulated, (b) the method does not 
admit avoidance responses, and (c) no measure of  compliance cost can be 
generated. It fails to be scientific because no understanding of the quantitative 
importance of  examples can be generated. While the scientific value of  this 
method is small, we need to learn from its effectiveness in communicating to 
policy  makers.  The  tabulation  of  individual  taxpayers  with  more  than 
$1,000,000 of  AGI who paid no taxes, beginning in the mid-seventies, and 
the subsequent tabulation of corporate taxpayers with no liabilities after 1981 
strongly motivated the subsequent tax legislation. 
Aggregative Data Studies 
The methods used in aggregative data studies approach at least one of the 
three problems. The data problem is circumvented by  aggregation. It is as- 
sumed that all data on households refer to the same universe, or decision mak- 
ers. Second, shifts in the expectation of conditioning variables are assumed to 
“cause” shifts in the mean response of decision makers. Third, the universe of 
decision makers is exogenous to the policy experiments being carried out. 
Work by  Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) and Gillepsie (1965) needs to be 
cited because they consciously attempt to deal with the burden of both trans- 
fers  and  public-good  producing  expenditures of  government.  Aaron  and 
McGuire (1970) attempted, and their work is unusual, to account for the de- 
clining marginal utility of consumption, thereby tackling the second problem 
cited. 
The aggregative studies give modest insight into reality including the ef- 
fects of avoidance behaviors on the status quo. The scientific shortcomings of 
such studies are that they offer no basis for ascertaining error and they incor- 
porate little or no behavioral response in calculating the tax  burden under 
counterfactual conditions. Such studies are always limited by some principle 
for classifying the population. Once selected, no alternative perspective on 
the population is possible. 
Microdata Studies 
Microdata studies offer several orders of magnitude of improvement on the 
aggregative studies. They replace the concentration on means in the aggrega- 
tive method with a procedure that permits nonzero covariance among vari- 
ables assembled from different data sources. (In the language of survey spe- 
cialists,  a  procedure  akin  to  mean  imputation is  replaced  by  mean  plus 
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The convenience of  the microdata methods is flexibility. The statistically 
matched data set implicitly contains the information required to display bur- 
den calculations in  a number of  dimensions. Curiously, this flexibility has 
seldom been used to display the inherent variability of  the population, as in 
tables 11.7 and 11.9. Furthermore, little has been done with analysis of het- 
erogeneity in the population and a concern to understand the second problem 
more deeply. 
The most neglected research on statistically matched data is the study of 
error. I repeat criticisms raised repeatedly, most recently by  Smeeding (1980). 
We  know almost nothing about the variance in the statistical matching pro- 
cess. While efforts have concentrated on minimizing the distance between two 
records for a match, almost nothing has been done on three easily studied 
questions. (a)  We  have knowledge of exact matched tax, income, and benefit 
data.  Simulation of  statistical matches on  those data would  give a clearer 
understanding of  the error involved in the process used by  the OTA  to gen- 
erate  its  individual income tax  model.  (b) As  Kadane  (1978) suggested, 
evidence on the missing partial correlations that is currently ignored in  the 
statistical matching process should be gathered and incorporated into the pro- 
cedure. (c)  Rubin (1987) advocates multiple matching (multiple imputation) 
so that we can know the variance that is generated by the algorithm for match- 
ing and can calculate better measures of association that depend on the impu- 
tation. None of  these ways  of  improving statistical matches is beyond our 
current capabilities and all would help us  understand the robustness of  the 
representation of  the distribution of population characteristics that we use in 
microsimulation. 
Other high priorities for the micromodel are to add estimates of compliance 
costs to allow us to compare tax systems that are correct but difficult to admin- 
ister with tax systems that are pragmatic and consider real resource costs in- 
volved in compliance and administration. Ott and Ott (1969) and H & R Block 
(Roper Organization 1977) provide data that could be used for such measures. 
I would urge that the classifier used in discriminating the effects of a tax 
system on vertical equity should relate to wealth, rather than income. The 
total of physical capital, financial capital, and human capital should be esti- 
mated  for each economic decision unit, and burden should be  tabulated in 
classes based on that total. This allows us to consider the effect of tax laws on 
the distribution of burden between generations and to incorporate an estimate 
of unrealized capital gains. 
General Equilibrium Modeling 
The Treasury’s general equilibrium (GE) model is the most sophisticated 
and the most vulnerable basis for assessing burden. The GE makes use of 
parameters of the utility function. It integrates consumption, saving, and fac- 
tor supply decisions within a household population. And  it models the total 
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the GE models incorporate utility functions, yet have seldom been  used to 
assess questions of vertical equity, while the microsimulation models that use 
no utility framework, have been relied upon for that purpose.) Over the past 
20 years we have learned a number of critical facts about GE modeling. 
Disaggregation of  GE Modelsfrom Two Sectors and 
Two Factors Is Essential 
Shoven (1976) demonstrated that variation in the tax system within the cor- 
porate manufacturing sector produced as much welfare loss as the distinctions 
between corporate and noncorporate enterprises. Mieszkowski (1  972) dem- 
onstrated without a doubt that the land factor must be considered separately 
from reproducible capital and  labor because of  its relation  to nontradable 
goods and immobile factors. Feldstein (1977) considered the importance of 
land as a vehicle for transferring wealth over time. 
What we have not yet learned is how much disaggregation is informative. 
The greater the number of sectors, factors, and assets, the more complex the 
problem of  “calibrating” the model and estimating underlying price data. At 
what point such disaggregation ceases to be informative because the errors in 
the data overwhelm the signal, we do not presently know. It seems essential to 
test the robustness of our present understandings to variations in the degree of 
disaggregation, a computational experiment that has been notably absent in 
the literature. 
Variations in the Cost of  Capital 
We  have learned that cost of  capital varies widely by  industry, asset type 
(Fullerton, Gillette, and Mackie 1988), legal organization, and financing ar- 
rangements (King 1977). We  have not yet leamed how to harness this price 
variation to an understanding of the economy. Fullerton and Henderson (1987) 
assume values for critical elasticities of substitution that determine the sensi- 
tivity of legal organization and asset composition to relative cost of capital. 
Needless to say, the results are not convincing as a description of  real eco- 
nomic processes. A major effort must be made to develop behavioral models 
of these responses based on observational data. 
Tar Law Asymmetries 
We  have learned that tax law asymmetries sharply differentiate the marginal 
consequences of investment between firms that carry forward losses and firms 
that do not (Altshuler and Auerbach 1987). GE models have not yet incorpo- 
rated this critical fact. 
Elasticities of  Substitution in Energy and Labor 
We  have learned that the elasticities of  substitution between energy and 
capital,  and  between  energy and  labor, are substantial (Berndt and Wood 
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in combination with a Leontief fixed-coefficient matrix determining the de- 
mand for intermediate product is clearly a poor representation of this knowl- 
edge. More generally, the production sector is curiously flexible in substitu- 
tions between capital and labor and totally inflexible in the use of intermediate 
products. This weakness can and should be remedied. 
The GE model makes no attempt to deal with behavioral responses to trans- 
fers and rules out problems in measuring burden that arise from public ex- 
penditures. The GE model incorporates a utility function that lacks the sub- 
sistence parameters that have been common in consumer demand systems and 
which would be critical for understanding relative burden of the poor and the 
rich. The model is not estimated, and no information is generated on the er- 
rors entailed in its policy simulation. 
Scientific evaluation of  the GE model calls for a variety  of  approaches. 
Reestimation of production and consumption submodels with state of  the art 
functional forms is a beginning. Perhaps more important is to understand the 
appropriate degrees of aggregation in this undertaking. As with macromodel- 
ing in general, more sectors and more representative consumers do not neces- 
sarily add to our understanding of the economy. Just as in the field of scientific 
sample design,  information gains must  be balanced  against costs-in  this 
case costs of estimation and model solution. 
Process of Research on Tax Burden 
Up to now the government has been a monopolist with control of the major 
databases used in tax burden studies. It has limited access to information gen- 
erated by  its models, and it has attempted to control legislative processes by 
asserting point estimates for the effects of changes in tax legislation. In the 
future this process can and should be radically different. The capability al- 
ready exists in the private sector to emulate the microsimulations carried on 
by  the Treasury. What is lacking is an institution that allows access to the 
databases for scientific research by nonpartisan economists. Models for such 
access exist-and  are  described  in  heeding, Rainwater,  and  O’Higgins 
(1988) and McGuckin and Pascoe (1988). The technology exists to make this 
type of  access inexpensive and within reach of  solo researchers, as we  have 
demonstrated with SIPP-ACCESS at the University of  Wisconsin (National 
Research Council 1988; David 1985). 
It will be important to coordinate the efforts of the Treasury, the Congres- 
sional Budget Office, and the Department of Health and Human Services to 
achieve the integration of  tax and transfer considerations in a single micro- 
computer model. We  know what to do. The potential to learn more than we 
have in the last 50 years is enormous. 
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Comment  Joseph A. Pechman 
Atrostic and NUMS  have prepared a comprehensive history of  the develop- 
ment of measures of the distribution of  tax burdens. I thought I might supple- 
ment their excellent account with some observations about the development 
of microdata files, with which I was closely associated. I would also like to 
suggest what might be done to improve the state of knowledge about the dis- 
tribution of income and taxes. 
My first encounter with microdata files occurred in the late 1930s, when I 
was assistant director of the Wisconsin Income Study. This study, which orig- 
inated  under  the  auspices of  the Conference on Research  in  Income and 
Wealth, provided tabulations and, later, analyses of  Wisconsin income tax 
returns for the years 1929-36  (Hanna, Lerner, and Pechman 1948). I believe 
that this was one of the first large-scale uses of computers in the analysis of 
the distribution of income and taxes. Because of the limitations of these early 
computers, the tabulations were generally of the Statistics of Income variety. 
We  also had a longitudinal sample of returns for the years 1929-36  and were 
able to prepare income distributions for 2, 3, . . . ,  7 years. I was aware of 
the potential use of  computers for simulation exercises, but the computers 
were much too slow and primitive for this purpose. 
The work on income distribution after World War I1 was carried forward 
mainly by  Selma Goldsmith and her associates Maurice Liebenberg and Hy- 
man Kaitz  in the Department of  Commerce (Office of  Business Economics 
1953; Goldsmith et al. 1954). Liebenberg and I had been members of a small 
staff at the Office of Price Administration, headed by Hildegarde Kneeland, 
which prepared estimates of the distribution of income for the purpose of es- 
timating the taxes needed to reduce consumption to manageable levels during 
the war (Office of Price Administration 1943). We  were all aware of the limi- 
tations of  consumer expenditure surveys and tabulations of tax  returns for 
income distribution purposes. These early efforts relied heavily on statistical 
(and even graphic) techniques to project earlier distributions (for example, the 
1935-36  consumer income and expenditure survey of the National Resources 
Planning Board) to subsequent years and to estimate the upper tail of the dis- 
tribution. Later, the Office of  Business Economics (now the Bureau of Eco- 
nomic Analysis) began publishing annual distributions of  income that were 
based on tax return data and the Census Bureau’s Current Population Surveys 
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(CPS), but these estimates were suspended because of the cost of preparing 
them and concern about their accuracy. 
The first use of  a tax model or tax file was in  1961, when  I persuaded 
Internal Revenue Service Commissioner Mortimor Caplin to make available 
to Brookings a sub sample from the Statistics of Income. Stanley Surrey, who 
was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy at the time, supported 
my  request to obtain the tax file for research purposes. The first file, which 
was for the year 1960, was used to make estimates of marginal and effective 
tax rates by  income classes and to simulate the revenue and distributional 
consequences of  structural changes in the tax system (Pechman 1965a). In 
those early days, the programming was done by Donald lbcker, then a young 
graduate student at MIT.  When the Treasury began to realize the potential of 
the tax file, it soon organized a small staE to prepare its own estimates of the 
effects  of  administration  and  congressional  tax  legislative proposals.  At 
Brookings, we have used the annual tax files almost continuously since those 
early days to analyze the distributional effects of changes in the tax law (see, 
e.g., Pechman 1965b). 
The idea of merging the tax and CPS survey data to estimate a “correct” 
distribution of  tax burdens occurred to me during the 1950s, when I was at- 
tempting to make estimates of the progressivity of the tax system. Colm and 
Tarasov in the late 1930s and Musgrave et al. (1951) in the late 1940s had 
used survey data to make such estimates, but I was acutely aware of the limi- 
tations of  those data, particularly in the top income classes. Moreover, the use 
of microdata rather than grouped data to estimate tax liabilities would give us 
greater accuracy and more flexibility in the calculations that could be made, 
particularly for the top and bottom tails of the income distribution. 
The first MERGE file was created at Brookings in the early 1970s. It was a 
statistical match between the 1966 tax file and the 1967 Survey of Economic 
Opportunity, which contained income and consumption data for 1966 (Pech- 
man and Okner 1974). Later, we prepared MERGE files on the basis of the 
CPS surveys for the years 1970 and 1975. I was fortunate to have as my asso- 
ciates in this enterprise Ben Okner and Joe Minarik, who developed the com- 
puter techniques for matching large data sets. These files provided the basis 
for the preparation of detailed estimates of the distribution of  tax burdens by 
income classes for 1966, 1970, 1975, 1980, and 1985 (Pechman 1985). 
In principle, a MERGE file should provide accurate estimates of the distri- 
bution of tax burdens by the social and economic characteristics of the popu- 
lation. The most common breakdown is by  income classes, but comparisons 
by size of family, home ownership vs. rental, age groups of family heads, and 
sources of  income are also possible. In addition, estimates of the variability 
of tax burdens within various population groups can be calculated (see tables 
11.7 and 11.8 of Atrostic and Nunns). Of course, all measures of tax burden 
depend on the incidence assumptions used and these are by no means settled 
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dence assumptions that span the range of opinion in the profession about tax 
incidence. 
Several others have also prepared MERGE files, but the number is rela- 
tively small because of the time-consuming and costly nature of the operation. 
The Treasury has produced several files for its purposes, most recently to es- 
timate the effects of the big tax reform that was finally enacted in  1986. The 
Congressional Budget  Office  has  also  prepared  similar  files  to  estimate 
changes in the distribution of tax burdens between 1975 and 1990. Peat, Mar- 
wick, and Main has a MERGE file for a recent year. There may be others in 
existence, but I am  not aware of them. 
There are two criticisms of the MERGE file technique, only one of which I 
agree with. The first is that statistical matching may not provide an accurate 
picture of the composition of income by income classes. I am not qualified to 
pass judgement on this criticism, but I have a hunch that the error, if  any, is 
small. 
The other criticism is one that I myself have expressed many times. The 
problem is that the top tail of the Consumer Population Surveys does not re- 
semble the tail of the income distribution that we know exists from tax re- 
turns. My  associates and I have  simply spliced on the tax tail to the survey 
data and made corresponding reductions in the number of family units in the 
lower part of the distribution to arrive at an overall distribution of income. I 
am not sure what the others have done, but I suspect they make approximately 
similar adjustments. Considering the advanced state of  our technology, it is 
criminal that we  are forced to use such an unsophisticated technique for so 
important a purpose. 
The remedy is to prepare an exact match between the Census CPS distribu- 
tions, tax returns, and other administrative records, such as the Social Secu- 
rity records. An  exact match would automatically provide accurate data on the 
composition of income of the sample units and would also tell us what correc- 
tion needs to be made to the upper tail of the distribution. I will leave it to the 
statisticians to devise techniques for splicing the tax return data onto the CPS 
data in the top tail of the distribution. 
An exact match has been completed by federal agencies at least twice in the 
past to my knowledge-for  1963 and  1973 (Social Security Administration 
1980 and  1981). The procedures were very time-consuming, so that the re- 
sults were ancient history when they were finally published. It seems to me 
that the time has come to plan for exact matches, say, once in every two or 
three years to provide the basis for accurate MERGE files, complete with 
breakdowns by income sources, demographic and employment data, and fam- 
ily status. Since there will be problems of confidentiality,  this project must be 
undertaken by  a federal agency, probably the Bureau of  the  Census, and 
should be released as promptly as possible. 
In closing, I should like to urge the Bureau of Economic Analysis to resume 
its work on income distribution. The availability of  the microdata from tax 419  Measuring Tax Burden: A Historical Perspective 
returns and the CPS  surveys should make it easier to estimate the distribution 
of income. If BEA were to resume its income distribution work,  it could help 
promote the idea of making periodic exact matches within government circles. 
It is time to emerge from the primitive stage and to enter the much more ad- 
vanced stage that modem technology permits. 
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